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Abstract/ Summary 
 
New Zealand is currently the third largest global producer of kiwifruit and thus plays an important role in the 
international market. Exports of kiwifruit are also of significant horticultural value for New Zealand and in 2007 the 
kiwifruit industry accounted for export values of NZ$790 million.  
 
The global kiwifruit market has experienced substantial changes in recent years and is likely to change significantly in 
the near future due to developments in production sources, adjustments to trade policy settings and shifts in consumer 
preferences. The New Zealand kiwifruit industry needs to consider what the impacts of these changes might be so that 
future strategies can be constructed effectively.  
 
Little quantitative modelling has been done in New Zealand to consider the impacts of changes to the global kiwifruit 
industry. The major contribution of this research was the development and calibration of a kiwifruit industry-specific 
partial equilibrium trade model. The model was then used to examine the impacts on New Zealand producers of these 
trade-related changes in the global kiwifruit market. Three relevant scenarios were developed for this purpose. They 
include a drop in EU demand through the introduction of a stricter Sanitary and Phytosanitary policy, an expansion of 
the Chinese kiwifruit industry where production is doubled by year 2013 and finally a trade liberalisation scenario 
where current import tariffs on kiwifruit were removed worldwide.  
 
It is clearly observed, through both the Chinese expansion scenario and the trade liberalisation scenario, what a potential 
impact and future role China has as a world market player. Increased availability of Chinese kiwifruit appears to affect 
New Zealand producer returns and exported quantities negatively, albeit not as significantly as the EU introduction of 
an SPS policy. A trade liberalisation scenario, on the other hand, proves to increase New Zealand grower returns 
significantly for all varieties.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key terms: International trade, kiwifruit, New Zealand, KIWI, China, SPS 
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Sammanfattning  
 
Nya Zeeland är för närvarande världens tredje största producent av kiwifrukt och spelar därmed en 
avgörande roll på den internationella marknaden. Export av kiwifrukt är även av signifikant 
hortikulturellt värde för Nya Zeeland och exportvärden uppgick till NZ$790 miljoner under 2007.  
 
Den globala kiwifruktsmarknaden har utsatts för avsevärda förändringar under senare år och lär 
sannolikt förändras markant inom den närmsta framtid med utvecklingen av produktionsmetoder, 
anpassning till olika handelspolitiska initiativ samt skift i konsumtionsmönster. Nya Zeelands 
kiwifruktsindustri bör beakta potentiella effekter av dessa förändringar så att framtida strategier kan 
konstrueras effektivt.  
 
Få studier fokuserade på kvantitativ modellering har utförts, som inkluderar effekterna av 
förändringar inom den globala kiwifruktsindustrin. Denna studie bidrar huvudsakligen till 
nuvarande litteratur genom utvecklingen och kalibreringen av en partiell handelsjämviktsmodell 
specificerad på kiwifruktsindustrin. Modellen har använts för att undersöka effekterna av 
handelsrelaterade förändringar på Nya Zeelands kiwifruktsproducenter. Tre relevanta scenarier 
utvecklades i detta syfte. De inkluderar en nedgång i EUs efterfrågan genom introduktionen av 
striktare veterinära och fytosanitära (SPS) åtgärder, en expansion av Kinas kiwifruktindustri genom 
en fördubbling av landets produktion till år 2013 och slutligen ett handelsliberaliseringsscenario där 
en världsomfattande avreglering av nuvarande importtullar på kiwifrukt utfördes. 
 
Det kan tydligt observeras, genom både Kinas expansionsscenario och 
handelsliberaliseringsscenariot, vilken potentiell effekt och framtida roll Kina har som aktör på 
världsmarknaden. Ökad tillgänglighet av kinesisk kiwifrukt förefaller påverka Nya Zeelaändska 
producentintäkter negativt, dock inte like signifikant som EUs introduktion av striktare SPS-
åtgärder. Ett handelsliberaliseringsscenario, å andra sidan, påvisar en avsevärd ökning av Nya 
Zeeländska producentintäkter för samtliga sorter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nyckelord: Internationell handel, kiwifrukt, Nya Zeeland, KIWI, Kina, SPS 
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1 Introduction 
 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry may have to face several trade-related issues in coming 
years as the global industry is confronted with strategic and structural challenges. These changes 
include different regulatory requirements on kiwifruit production methods and the growth in 
production in several competitor countries. New Zealand is currently the third largest global 
producer of kiwifruit and thus plays an important role on the international market. Exports of 
kiwifruit are also of significant horticultural value for New Zealand. Therefore, the objective of 
my thesis is to quantify and analyse the possible effects that these changes might have on the 
kiwifruit industry especially in New Zealand. 
 
Kiwifruit is grown and traded internationally and the world market is dominated by a few main 
players.  The world’s three largest producers have until recently been represented by Italy, New 
Zealand and Chile. China has recently overtaken Chile and New Zealand as the largest producer. 
Trends in global exports are consequently heavily influenced by the production levels in the top 
producing countries. A significant part of this thesis will therefore consider potential changes in 
those countries with the largest impact on the world kiwifruit market. 
 
The thesis initially concentrates on a descriptive analysis of the growth and structure of the 
kiwifruit industry in New Zealand and overseas. It investigates some of the most relevant trade-
related issues concerning the global industry in general and the New Zealand kiwifruit industry 
in particular. In particular the growth and potential changes in Chinese and EU industries will be 
assessed. The thesis will then review the economic theory and the literature to assess how these 
changes may affect the kiwifruit industry. A new kiwifruit trade model will be described, using 
industry specific countries and varieties based on the Lincoln Trade and Environment Model 
(LTEM). It is a partial equilibrium trade model, which can simulate effects that various domestic 
agriculture and border policy changes would have on price, supply, demand and net trade.  
 
The thesis will focus on trade-related issues facing the global kiwifruit industry through a trade 
modelling approach. This work appears to be the first application of such a method to analyse 
trade issues affecting this specific industry. This research will utilise an established method (the 
LTEM) and the core of the thesis will concentrate on scenarios concerning a potential EU import 
ban on conventional kiwifruit, a trade liberalisation scenario and a case of Chinese industry 
expansion. In every case the impact on New Zealand producer returns will be estimated. 
 
 
1.1 Hypotheses 
 
The specific hypotheses being assessed are as follows: 
 
1. A drop in EU imports and consumption, due to a stricter Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) policy, of all New Zealand kiwifruit will decrease New Zealand kiwifruit export 
values. 
The expected result of this scenario, according to theory, would suggest that the drop in EU 
consumption will reduce imported quantity of kiwifruit. Producers in the EU are better off, since 
the SPS policy restricts imports and thereby protects domestic producers from international 
competition. Consumers in the EU are worse off, due to fewer products at a higher price. 
Producers in the exporting country (New Zealand in this case) suffer from reduced exports and 
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hence lower returns. New Zealand producers are hence negatively affected by a potential EU 
introduction of a stricter SPS policy. 
 
2. An expansion in Chinese production will lead to reduced NZ producer returns. 
If China, being considered as a major producing and exporting country, contributes to an 
increased supply of kiwifruit on the world market, theory suggests that world prices of kiwifruit 
will be reduced due to the significant increase of supply. If New Zealand kiwifruit is considered 
homogenous with Chinese kiwifruit, and compete for the same market share, a Chinese 
expansion will have a negative impact on New Zealand producers in terms of lower returns. 
 
3. A trade liberalisation scenario will reduce New Zealand producer returns. 
This scenario will be examined through changing all import tariffs in all relevant countries in the 
model to zero. With all import barriers eliminated worldwide, an increase in import demand will 
occur. Exporters respond to the change by offering exports at a higher price. World prices in 
kiwifruit consequently increase and, as a result, New Zealand producers are better off through 
higher producer returns.  
 
 
1.2. Description of chapters 
 
This thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the research problem, the 
objective of the thesis and finally the specific scenarios developed in order to fulfil the objective. 
 
Chapter two provides a detailed background of the history and development of the New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry. Other significant players on the global market are introduced along with the 
current issues concerning the international industry. 
 
Chapter three presents the rationale for trade and the theoretical consequences of relevant trade 
restrictions.  
 
Chapter four defines the analytical framework of this research and conclusively presents the 
most relevant structure. 
 
Chapter five reviews present literature relevant to this research and how similar studies have 
been carried out in the past. The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part presents 
literature focused on the kiwifruit industry. The second part reviews analytical approaches used 
in relevant trade modelling analysis. It explains how they contribute to this study and also 
provides an understanding of the gaps in the literature where this research will be of significant 
value. 
 
Chapter six explains the methodology used in this research. It discusses underlying theory of the 
industry-specific trade model developed, data sources and assumptions. 
 
The main scenarios investigated in this research are presented in chapter seven.  
 
Chapter eight describes the results of each scenario and provides a further understanding of the 
outcome through a discussion. 
 
The final chapter presents the key conclusions of this study and the implications of these results for 
the New Zealand kiwifruit industry and policymakers, and subsequently discusses limitations and 
recommendations for future research.  
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2 Background 
 
This chapter will provide an extensive analysis of the growth and structure of the New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry. It subsequently puts New Zealand in an international context by describing 
the country’s role on the global market and describing other players with a significant impact on 
the world industry. The chapter concludes with an introduction to the essence of the thesis: the 
potential strategic and structural challenges ahead. 
 
2.1. History 
 
2.1.1. Early history 
 
Actinidia Chinesis, the botanical name of the plant, was first found along the border of the 
Yangtse River valley in China (Yerex and Haines, 1983). The first foreign collectors of the 
plants were of British and American origin, discovering and sending the first plants home in 
1847 and 1904, respectively. One of the Englishmen chose to call the fruit “Ichang gooseberry” 
consistent with the name of the city Ichang, where the botanical findings were first made. The 
name was later changed to simply “Chinese gooseberry”, to clearly illustrate its country of origin 
(Yerex and Haines 1983). 
 
During the 1920s and 1930s in New Zealand, the still unpopular vine was generally planted in 
random unoccupied spaces, mainly because it was easy to grow and had an ornamental value. It 
gained some minor appreciation on the New Zealand market for three reasons: it was the only 
fresh fruit that ripened in June or July (in New Zealand), it was easily managed and it had a 
novel and characteristic appearance and flavour. The first commercial plantings were established 
in 1937, according to official records (Yerex and Haines, 1983). 
 
In 1940, because of the Second World War, the New Zealand Government decided to ban all 
imports of fresh fruits, effectively forcing people to search for substitutes on the domestic 
market. There were only a few varieties of apples in winter, which contributed to the sudden 
interest in Chinese gooseberries (Yerex and Haines, 1983). 
 
In the 1960s, New Zealand shipments of not only fruits, but also plants and seeds, were being 
carried out to new destinations such as Germany, Italy, Spain, India, South America, Morocco, 
Israel and South Africa. Plants were quickly distributed worldwide and by the early 1970s New 
Zealand nursery keepers struggled to meet foreign demand (Yerex and Haines, 1983). 
 
 
2.1.2. Kiwifruit in New Zealand: the development of the industry 
 
The progression of new kiwifruit plantings was relatively slow in the 1970s but advanced 
dramatically in 1979 when almost 1500 hectares were planted within a year. Over the period of 
1972 to 1982 sales activity and farmland values increased dramatically (Johnston and Sandrey, 
1990) and demand for land for the purpose of planting kiwifruit increased by 54 percent between 
1983 and 1986 (Lees 1993). This followed as a consequence of the existing and expected high 
market returns during this period (Johnston and Sandrey, 1990).  
 
The original plantings of kiwifruit were almost entirely concentrated to Te Puke in the Bay of 
Plenty and by 1973, the Bay of Plenty area accounted for 90 percent of total domestic production 
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(Zespri, 2004). However, as land got scarce in the region, land prices increased in the early 
1980s. Other areas were consequently explored and developed for kiwifruit production. Land 
prices in other regions such as Auckland, Northland, Nelson, Hawkes Bay, Poverty Bay, Lower 
North Island and Waikato were significantly lower and thus invested in to a greater extent 
(Yerex and Haines 1983). It was not until the 1990’s that total orchard yield started to approach 
commercial levels (Lees, 1993).  
 
In the 1970s the proportion of total production that was exported was only 60 percent, mainly 
because the domestic market absorbed much of the fruit and the management and marketing 
efforts towards the global market were still in their development stages. By 1978, exports had 
increased to over 80 percent of total output and continued to increase during the 1980s (Lees, 
1993).  
 
In 1993, the average orchard size was small. Eighty percent of farms were less than five hectares, 
40 percent were less than two hectares and smaller orchards were also common (Lees, 1993). In 
2006, New Zealand had approximately 3200 kiwifruit orchards with an average size of 3.43 
hectares (Belrose Inc, 2006). Most orchards are still situated in the Bay of Plenty with its 8600 
hectares of kiwifruit1, accounting for 72 percent of the country’s total production. The area of 
planted kiwifruit in this region has increased by six percent since 1994 compared to a two 
percent decrease for New Zealand in general (Statistics New Zealand, 2002). 
 
Figure 1: New Zealand kiwifruit exports 1999-2005.  
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Source: (Belrose Inc, 2006) 
 
                                                          
1 as at June 2002. 
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Europe (EU-15) and Japan are by far the most valuable export markets for New Zealand 
kiwifruit. In 2005, 56 percent of New Zealand kiwifruit (by value) was sold in Europe and 18 
percent was sold in Japan (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
 
 
Early investments 
 
A couple of decades ago New Zealand agriculture experienced a major change in the 
composition of agricultural production as the interest in growing kiwifruit dramatically 
expanded. Citrus and tobacco plantings were transformed into kiwifruit orchards and dairy farms 
were sold in favour of finding land to plant kiwifruit. Entrepreneurs and professional investors 
contributed to the investment rush between 1979 and 1983 (Zespri, 2004). 
 
The New Zealand industry developed rapidly in the 1980s, stimulated by high commodity prices 
and tax incentives. Several investors borrowed heavily in order to buy orchards at prices based 
on forecasts of continued high producer returns. However, returns fell dramatically in 1987 
forcing many new growers out of business. In addition, orchard values fell, leaving growers with 
minimal equity, or even worse, no equity at all. With interest rates (and hence debt servicing 
costs) simultaneously increasing to record levels, the industry was in need of restructure to stay 
viable (Lees, 1993). 
 
Lower orchard values after 1986 enabled new entrants on the market to borrow less to establish 
an orchard and enter with high equity. Interest rates were also significantly lower and these 
factors combined allowed the industry to be viable, even with lower market returns (Lees, 1993). 
 
Since kiwifruit plants take up to six years to reach full production, the increase in plantings did 
not affect supplies until the late 1980s. The results of investments in the 1980s became clear in 
1990 when production statistics showed an increase of 400 percent from 1982 (Lees, 1993). 
 
 
Orchard profitability 
 
Orchard profitability is one of the most significant factors behind changes in the industry and the 
government plays an important role through its financial policies including interest rates, 
taxation, exchange rates and inflation (Lees, 1993).  
 
In 1976, orchard profitability was at its highest, presenting real returns of 27.83 New Zealand 
dollars2 per tray. Returns have decreased steadily ever since because of increased kiwifruit 
volumes on the world market and, in the 1970’s, also because of high inflation compared to other 
main markets (Lees, 1993). Returns peaked in 1982, which was subsequently reflected in land 
values in the Bay of Plenty expanding by over 800 percent between 1972 and 1982 (Johnston 
and Sandrey, 1990). Following the 1982 peak in per-tray return, the demand for land increased 
and kiwifruit plantings grew by over 54 percent in three years. The devaluation of the New 
Zealand dollar against the yen and the deutschmark combined with a relatively low crop 
compared to the previous season generated high New Zealand dollar returns in 1986 (Lees, 
1993). 
 
The emergence and development of competitors in Italy, France, Japan and the USA proved to 
have long-term negative effects for New Zealand producers (Lees, 1993) and lead to a significant 
                                                          
2 Calculations were based on the base year of 1991. 
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decline in world prices for kiwifruit between 1982 and 1988 (Zwart and Moore, 1990). By 1988, 
an even larger threat appeared with the development of a Chilean kiwifruit industry, representing 
direct competition with New Zealand's marketing season from April to December (Willis, 1994). 
 
Another challenge for the global kiwifruit industry occurred between 1987 and 1989 and was 
caused by monetary instability (both in interest rates and exchange rates) and an expansion of 
world supply. The latter reduced producer returns for existing producers such as New Zealand 
(Willis, 1994). 
 
 
2.1.3. Impacts of New Zealand reforms (in the mid-late 1980s) 
 
In July 1984, the New Zealand Government introduced an extensive economic liberalisation 
programme that would allow the economy’s overall efficiency and sustainable growth rate to 
increase by reducing or simplifying total government interventions. The pressure for reform was 
derived from a number of problems threatening the New Zealand economy, including the 
agricultural sector. The country’s overseas debt was growing, industries illustrated poor growth 
performance and agriculture was heavily dependent on governmental compensation, support and 
border protection (Wallace, 1990). The unsustainable situation in the agricultural sector led to an 
increased supply of low value commodities, an industry separated from actual market demand, 
inappropriate use of resources and inhibited innovation (Sayre, 2003). When the United 
Kingdom entered the European Union in 1973, New Zealand lost significant market access to its 
dominant export market for dairy. The United Kingdom had always taken special consideration 
of agricultural products from its fellow Commonwealth member, but was to be part of an even 
larger trading agreement leaving New Zealand with lower guarantees. Combined with existing 
agricultural protectionism overseas, this would result in major impacts on New Zealand’s 
agricultural export returns (Rayner, 1990).  
 
New Zealand was one of the first developed countries to completely deregulate its agricultural 
sector by removing all forms of price supports and subsidies in 1984. At first, the reform had a 
strong impact on the sector and on farm profitability. Land values, commodity prices and farm 
profitability finally stabilised or at least increased steadily in 1990, after a difficult transition 
period of six years (Sayre, 2003). 
 
 
Overseas exchange rates and inflation 
 
Exports of kiwifruit, and consequently New Zealand producer prices, have always been 
dependent on financial situations in export markets. The level and volatility of foreign exchange 
rates play a significant role in determining the returns to New Zealand kiwifruit producers. A 
depreciating home currency (i.e. the New Zealand dollar) has – ceteris paribus – a favourable 
impact on domestic farmers who export, since it implies that overseas sales are worth more in 
terms of New Zealand dollars. However, the precise consequence of a currency change on 
commodity prices and returns is dependent on which countries those commodities are exported 
to (Reynolds and Moore, 1990). 
 
The two main currencies influencing and partly determining New Zealand producer prices of 
kiwifruit are the European euro and the Japanese yen, currently accounting for more than 74 
percent of New Zealand’s total export sales (Belrose Inc, 2006). Between 1980 and 1986, the 
New Zealand dollar was heavily devaluated against both the then deutschmark and the yen. The 
New Zealand currency was finally fully floated in mid-1985. Between 1986 and 1993, the New 
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Zealand dollar fell by 14 percent against the deutschmark and 11 percent against the yen (Lees, 
1993). The pre-float devaluations and subsequent floating of the New Zealand dollar 
significantly affected the domestic kiwifruit industry during these years by maintaining a certain 
level of returns for growers while being challenged by falling prices and rising margins overseas. 
After the liberalisation of the country’s economy the value of the New Zealand dollar 
strengthened in 1987, leading to a decrease in exports, which consequently affected the 
profitability of New Zealand farmers. The removal of agricultural subsidies a few years earlier 
also influenced the low orchard profitability between 1987 and 1989 (Zwart and Moore, 1990).  
 
The New Zealand economy suffered from relatively high inflation throughout most of the 
1980’s, which rose significantly above the average of most trading partners between 1984-1988 
(Wallace, 1990). The Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by an average annual rate of 15 
percent and inflation peaked in 1986 at a level of 18 percent. The horticultural products price 
index followed a similar development, peaked however in 1985 and increased annually by 5 
percent until 1990. This resulted in a decrease in real kiwifruit prices by 76 percent between 
1980 and 1991 (Lees, 1993). 
 
High interest rates throughout the 1980’s had a major effect on the profitability and viability of 
the kiwifruit industry. As previously mentioned, investing growers had to borrow heavily to 
afford covering initial orchard development and production costs. High inflation and government 
deficits forced interest rates to a peak in 1987 at a level of 18 percent. An industry suffering 
through a high amount of debt at a high level of interest could only survive through 
compensating high returns via a substantial export yield. However, since kiwifruit takes five to 
six years to reach full production, the newly-developing orchards did not manage to achieve 
satisfactory harvests in time. Not only did the kiwifruit producers suffer from record high debt 
servicing costs, but they also struggled with falling kiwifruit returns and decreasing orchard 
values. As a result, many producers were forced into an equity crisis (Lees, 1993). Orchard costs, 
however, had decreased by 66 percent between 1982 and 1991 (Lees, 1993).  
 
Interest rates and inflation fell dramatically between 1987 and 1993, relieving the industry from 
high debt servicing costs, which allowed growers to stay viable under lower returns. Gains in 
commodity prices and a small decline in the real exchange rate after 1988 improved the terms of 
agricultural trade and the New Zealand kiwifruit industry (Lees, 1993). 
 
As international competition increased, more pressure was put on the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry to continuously perform better than its competitors. The decline in world price for 
kiwifruit, due to more players and further supply on the global market, had a negative impact on 
the domestic industry. With increased world competition in the 1990’s the selling period for the 
New Zealand kiwifruit industry was constricted to a shorter period where New Zealand had to 
sell more kiwifruit and also directly compete with European summer fruit (Lees, 1993). 
According to Zwart and Moore (1990), the need for a stronger position in the marketplace and 
the lack of appropriate incentives in the previous licensing system caused the demand for a 
statutory marketing board to control industry exports.  
 
 
2.1.4. Current industry structure 
 
In 1970, the need was expressed by growers and the industry for an agency to promote kiwifruit 
worldwide. As previously mentioned, the export share of total production only accounted for 60 
percent and the establishment of a global management and marketing agency was believed to be 
able to increase that quantity (Lees, 1993). The Kiwifruit Export Promotion Committee (KEPC) 
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was established in 1970 to make marketing of the fruit more professional. This was going to be 
achieved through a promotion fund, based on money extracted from a compulsory levy of ten 
cents per tray (six cents from the grower and four cents from the exporter) (Lees, 1993). Multi-
language brochures were produced emphasising the advantages of the fruit with some technical 
information and the history behind the fruit. These catalogues were subsequently delivered to 
retail stores (Zespri, 2004). Since the KEPC was the only kiwifruit organisation at the time, it 
ended up operating further than its original purpose and acting as an important decision maker in 
the industry (Lees, 1993).  
 
The New Zealand industry developed quickly in the 1970’s and so did the number of potential 
exporters interested in promoting New Zealand kiwifruit overseas. This consequently put the 
growers in a vulnerable position, as the grower-funded marketing no longer was in their direct 
control and could be exploited by anyone interested in making profits as an exporter (Lees, 
1993). The need for coordination between marketing and promotion had become apparent and 
potential exporters needed to be better controlled. Based on this need the New Zealand Kiwifruit 
Authority (NZKA) was founded in 1977, represented by five growers, two exporters and a 
government nominee. The primary purposes of the authority were to licence exporters, promote 
the fruit and to set standards for quality, grading and packing. The funding of the authority was 
set up as previously. The three major export companies in the 1960s – Turners and Growers, 
Fruitgrowers Federation and Auckland Export – still remained the main players on the global 
market. Together they accounted for over 60 percent of New Zealand kiwifruit exports (Lees, 
1993). 
 
After the peak in grower returns in 1982, they kept falling and the need for a changed marketing 
system grew stronger (Lees, 1993). A report by Coopers & Lybrand in 1988 investigated the 
marketing, selling and distribution system of the industry and concluded that there was an urgent 
need for a restructure if potential earnings of kiwifruit exports were to be reached. This could 
only be accomplished if a new marketing strategy was implemented. In 1988, the NZKA was 
reformed into the New Zealand Kiwifruit Marketing Board (NZKMB) and the New Zealand 
Kiwifruit Marketing Regulations were established to allow the NZKMB as the single seller of 
kiwifruit internationally, except for Australia (Lees, 1993). 
 
In 1992, the NZKMB radically overestimated the value of the crop that year, which resulted in 
overpaying growers early in the season and subsequently incurring a debt of over NZ$93 million 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 1996). The financial difficulties arising from this 
problematic situation put pressure on the Government to review the entire structure of the 
kiwifruit industry. Consequently, the Government instigated a three-stage review process.  
 
 
The development of the NZKMB 
 
The first step emphasised the need for grower representation within the industry. Through 
changing the NZKMB into a corporate structure, the growers would be given direct equity 
involvement. The new company structure would not only provide total grower control but would 
also encourage potential partners and investors from outside of the industry to take part as 
stakeholders (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum, 1995). Growers were previously 
represented in the industry through representatives on the NZKMB and through the Fruitgrowers 
Federation (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 1997). In order to provide growers with more 
authority within the industry an independent grower representative forum was established in 
1993 (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc, n.d.). The New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers 
Incorporated (NZKGI) now represents growers in discussions on industry issues. The forum 
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consists of representatives from all over the country and has played an important role in 
negotiations concerning topics such as contract options and payment systems (Zespri, 2004). 
During the industry review, the NZKGI was given the important roles of appointing members of 
the NZKMB and representing the group to which the Statutory Board is responsible (New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum, 1995). 
 
Collaborative marketing 
 
In October 1994, the University of Auckland presented an independent marketing review to the 
kiwifruit industry. Several recommendations from this report were taken into consideration 
during the ongoing review of the kiwifruit industry and came to establish the second step of the 
industry review: restructuring the marketing within the industry. 
 
The report suggested that strategic marketing development should focus on “retail marketing 
rather than commodity trading” (Brookes, Cartwright and Domney, 1994). It was also 
recommended that the scale of the industry should be increased globally, through sourcing of 
internationally grown kiwifruit and by linking New Zealand kiwifruit to other fruit markets  
(Brookes, Cartwright and Domney, 1994).   
 
These recommendations suggested a development of a joint marketing strategy, which would be 
implemented by a marketing subsidiary separate from the NZKMB. The Kiwifruit Industry 
Review adopted most recommendations and subsequently suggested that export marketing 
should be collaborative and performed by a marketing subsidiary to the NZKMB, cooperating 
with innovative organisations and marketing firms. This committee should be formed in order to 
receive and process applications and to make recommendations to the statutory NZKMB (New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum, 1995).  
 
The review distinguished several specific advantages of having a marketing subsidiary separated 
from the NZKMB to control and carry out the international marketing operations. Firstly, 
transferring any commercial issues from the tasks of the NZKMB to a specific marketing 
subsidiary would contribute to the execution of a more reliable and accountable power of 
corporate governance. Secondly, the new structure would improve the overall focus of the 
organisation, since the NZKMB would concentrate exclusively on statutory, legal and policy 
issues and the subsidiary would concentrate on international marketing, rather than one 
organisation managing all activities and issues facing the industry. It would also enable the 
marketing subsidiary to enter potential joint ventures and appoint collaborative marketers 
without distracting from the core business (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum 1995). 
The NZKMB was consequently transformed into the new entities Kiwifruit New Zealand (KNZ), 
managing the statutory issues, and the Zespri International Ltd controlling the international 
marketing of the industry (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 1997). 
 
The third part of the industry review included several additional suggestions of how the industry 
could improve its overall performance. The recommendations were not as explicit as in the first 
two stages of the review, but provided a framework for how to develop the best production 
structure. It suggested that marketing and production management should be separated as far as 
possible and that the current marketer (NZKMB) should be restructured into a ‘marketer 
focused’ organisation. This separation would encourage the marketer to predict market 
requirements and behaviour and the supplier to meet market demand and product quality (New 
Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum, 1995). 
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The future regulatory environment would provide growers and other players with more 
flexibility concerning time options of supplying fruit to marketers. The removal of any legal 
distinction between packhouses and growers would encourage the development of contractual 
relationships between NZKMB and ‘supplier entities’ (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 
1997). A supplier entity is a group of growers and post harvest facilities (such as packing, 
coolstorage and ship loading) cooperating to deliver a certain volume of packed kiwifruit with a 
certain quality (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2002). 
 
The industry review also stated that the responsibility of fruit standards and quality assurance 
would belong to the NZKMB, but that the grower would be responsible for picking the fruit at 
the best time, with the incentive of receiving premiums or being punished with penalties, 
depending on the quality of the fruit (New Zealand Kiwifruit Growers Inc Forum, 1995). 
 
 
The ZESPRI story 
 
The name ZESPRI was chosen with the purpose to establish a new image for kiwifruit 
worldwide, based on a protected trademark (Zespri International Limited, 2005). The industry 
was fully re-structured in 2000 and the NZKMB was converted into the public company Zespri 
Group Ltd, in which the growers became shareholders. This was in accordance with the 
Kiwifruit Industry Restructuring Act 1999. The possession of shares was originally restricted 
exclusively to grower suppliers (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 2004), whereas these 
days a significant proportion of shareholders are no longer supplying fruit (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 2005). In November that year, the growers approved the creation of a 
cooperative style mechanism within a commercial operating structure (Regulations Review 
Committee, 2002). 
 
In this restructuring phase of the industry the Kiwifruit Export Regulations were established 
recognising ZESPRI Group Ltd as a single desk exporter. This exclusively authorised ZESPRI 
Group Ltd to export and market New Zealand kiwifruit overseas, excluding the Australian 
market (Hardie Boys, 1999). According to the Kiwifruit Industry Restructuring Act 1999 (New 
Zealand Government 1999) and the Kiwifruit Export Regulations 1999 (Hardie Boys, 1999), 
Kiwifruit New Zealand was established as the regulatory board controlling Zespri Group Ltd and 
its compliance with the single desk structure (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2005). 
 
The Kiwifruit Export Regulations were tightened in 2004 by the Horticultural Export Authority 
(HEA). Australia was the only market that ZESPRI did not control as a statutory export 
monopoly. However, the Australian market had to be regulated as well since the country had 
become a gateway for illegal kiwifruit shipments further to other New Zealand export markets, 
such as China, undercutting New Zealand’s prices (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2004). 
Every exporter is now entitled to apply to HEA for export licenses to Australia (New Zealand 
Horticulture Export Authority, 2004).  
 
ZESPRI was determined to move the New Zealand kiwifruit industry away from the stagnant 
kiwifruit category into competing with the entire market for fresh fruit (Zespri, 2004). The 
different varieties competing on the international market today include the ZESPRI™ Green 
(green), the traditional Hayward cultivar; ZESPRI™ Green Organic (green organic), grown to 
meet the quality standards of the company; ZESPRI™ Green Jumbo, falling under the category 
of larger kiwifruits; ZESPRI™ Gold (gold), the newer variety with yellow flesh and sweeter 
flavour (Zespri, 2004). 
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The New Zealand kiwifruit industry has developed and grown significantly over the past decades 
since its inception. In 1975 exports were valued at NZ$4.3 million and in 1990, the value was 
NZ$539 million – New Zealand’s sixth largest food export sector at the time (Campbell, 
Fairweather and Steven, 1997). In 2005, exports to over 60 countries were worth NZ$720 
million and was by far the most valuable horticultural export product in New Zealand3 
(HortResearch 2005). In 2007 kiwifruit exports were worth NZ$790 million (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2007). 
 
 
Distribution channels  
 
Over the last couple of decades specialisation has occurred in the New Zealand kiwifruit 
industry. The orchards used to manage both growing and packing, but with a continuously 
expanding production the supply chain has been divided into separate specialised units to enable 
the management of larger quantities. The orchards now concentrate only on growing kiwifruit 
and special packhouses and cool storages are dedicated to the downstream steps in the supply 
chain.  
 
The number of packhouses has continuously decreased since 1988 due to intense competitive 
pressure (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 1997). and in 1991 only 22 percent of them packed 
less than 25,000 trays annually. As production increased, so did the size of the average 
packhouse. Most had an upgraded capacity of 200,000 trays by 1991 (Lees 1993) and also 
managed a significant number of orchards. The packhouses either leased orchards to guarantee 
sufficient supplies or they solicited growers to be part of a packhouse cooperative. The first 
stages of the kiwifruit supply chain have thus changed during the last decades from being based 
on family-owned entities managing several tasks, into separate units with different economic 
interests (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 1997). 
 
Coolstore facilities enable an extension of the packing season through the storage of fruit in bulk 
to be packed at a later point (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 1997). The number of 
coolstores has not increased significantly since 1988, but most of them have expanded their 
capacity to receive a larger input of fruit (Lees, 1993). 
 
 
2.1.5. Industry strategies 
 
As described above, New Zealand has developed its kiwifruit industry over several decades and 
currently enjoys a competitive advantage in several areas. A few of the main strategies and 
production programmes leading to these advantages are described below and some of them 
constitute the reason for the relatively high international price premiums that New Zealand 
kiwifruit benefits from today. 
 
 
KiwiGreen 
 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry had to confront a severe crisis in 1990-1992 when Italian 
retailers threatened to take the entire industry to court. They argued that New Zealand kiwifruit 
contained pesticide levels exceeding local standards, while New Zealand claimed that they in 
fact were well within the requirements for European regulations. Since Italy belonged to one of  
New Zealand’s most important export markets with annual fruit imports of three million trays, 
                                                          
3 Kiwifruit NZ$ 720 million, wine NZ$433 million and apples NZ$387 million HortResearch (2005). 
 12 
 
for the value of NZ$30 million, the decision had a severe impact on the New Zealand industry. 
The kiwifruit industry formed a partnership with HortResearch, aiming to develop an integrated 
pest management (IPM) programme, called KiwiGreen, to reduce the use of chemicals through 
careful and comprehensive inspections (Growing Futures, n.d.). 
 
Research towards an IPM programme had started already in the 1980’s to control the number of 
pests through the use of less environmentally harmful sprays (Campbell, Fairweather and Steven, 
1997). The long-term goal with the new programme was to convince all kiwifruit orchards 
producing export fruit to apply the environmentally sustainable KiwiGreen system as soon as 
feasible. The first trial production of 262 000 trays under the new management scheme was 
successfully accomplished in 1992. During the following years the number increased 
continuously4 and in the season of 1996/1997 all kiwifruit exported from New Zealand were 
produced using the new KiwiGreen system. It has been used nationwide within the entire 
industry ever since. Such a fast and efficient adoption of a new production programme by an 
entire industry, without government intervention, was considered unique for its time (Growing 
Futures, n.d.). The system was expanded in 2000, under the name Zespri System, introducing 
additional environmental factors, hygiene and ethical trading practices, inspecting the entire 
supply chain from orchard to market. The production management system now also includes 
requirements on environmentally friendly coolstores and transports, certain temperatures during 
transport, managing reject fruit and the use of recyclable packaging. The stages of the system are 
monitored and audited by the Ministry of Agriculture and enables the traceability of 
commodities (Zespri, n.d.). The implementation of KiwiGreen has contributed to the advantage 
that New Zealand kiwifruit can be sold at relatively large premiums, compared to other 
countries. 
 
 
Traceability 
 
Competitive global trends and challenges influence product quality and safety throughout the 
supply chain and in international food trade. As a consequence of growing concerns from food 
scares, consumers and other stakeholders are putting pressure on requirements about how food is 
grown and managed on its way to the consumer, in terms of agricultural practice, animal welfare 
and environmental impact (Opara and Mazaud, 2001). Satisfactory food quality requires a 
certain level of transparency throughout the supply chain, which acts like a guarantee to the 
consumer (Opara and Mazaud, 2001). Several agricultural management programs and 
regulations have been implemented worldwide recently to ensure a certain level of quality and 
safety demanded by consumers (Opara and Mazaud, 2001) and the KiwiGreen system is one of 
them. 
 
Traceability refers to the availability of information of all processes and stages of the supply 
chain, which certifies the origin and journey of a specific product. Traceability adds value to the 
quality and safety regulations by providing “the communication linkage for identifying, 
verifying and isolating sources of non-compliance to agreed standards and customer 
expectations” (Opara and Mazaud, 2001).  
                                                          
4 4.7 million trays in 1993, 6.8 million trays in 1994 and 63 million trays in 1996/1997.  
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Implementing EurepGAP standards 
 
In May 2003, Zespri gained the certification for having a Produce Marketing Organisation5 
system that meets the requirements of the internationally recognised standards of EurepGAP. 
According to the regulations, growers must comply with terms such as minimising the damaging 
impact on the environment, reducing the use of agrichemicals, using appropriate resources and 
recognising an acceptable level of health and safety for workers (Patel, 2003). 
 
EurepGAP was established in 1997 as an initiative by mainly British and continental European 
retailers to take more responsibility and react to concerns from both consumers and producers. 
The consumers were worried about product safety, environmental sustainability and labour 
principles and producers were concurrently interested in developing a common certification 
standard. The EurepGAP consists of a set of normative standards and internationally recognised 
certification criteria that demonstrate compliance with consumer-focused Good Agricultural 
Practices (EurepGAP, n.d.). Many of the principles within EurepGAP are not new to New 
Zealand growers, as they are incorporated in the already practiced Integrated Crop and Pest 
Management (ICM and IPM) systems (Agriquality, n.d.). 
 
 
The Gold story 
 
The story of ZESPRI™ Gold began in the late 1970s when seeds for the research project of 
developing a new variety were collected in the Beijing Botanical Gardens in China. These were 
subsequently planted in the research orchard in Te Puke, New Zealand. A couple of years later 
further seeds were collected in China. These seeds and the second generation of the earlier 
collected seeds were crossed because of their attractive characteristics. They created fruits with 
yellow flesh and sweet flavour and large luscious fruits. A generation later in 1992 one single 
plant was selected from this new family (Zespri, n.d).  
 
The first stage was completed and next followed the development of the characteristics of the 
new fruit. Commercial considerations like taste, colour, size, storage and shelf life had to be 
taken into account. In 1997, almost 400 hectares of Te Puke land was dedicated to the new 
variety and the first 4000 trays were exported the following year. In 2000, the kiwifruit was 
launched and received the name ZESPRI™ Gold (gold); Plant Variety Rights were taken out in 
order to protect it internationally. The purpose of developing gold was never to substitute it for 
the green variety, but rather to act as a complementary product to extend the options for 
customers and consumers (Zespri, 2004). New Zealand is the world sole exporter of golden 
kiwifruit and this variety currently accounts for almost 18 percent of total kiwifruit exports from 
New Zealand (Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
 
Twelve month supply 
 
Plantings of green and gold kiwifruit grown under the ZESPRI brand have currently been 
established in eight different countries. The fruit must reach the premium brand and quality 
standards established by ZESPRI in order to be sold on the respective markets. Italy and Japan 
are experiencing successful Gold plantings in particular, whereas the Californian growers are 
                                                          
5 A Produce Marketing Organisation is a co-operative or a group of growers with a legal entity to manage the 
EurepGAP implementation for associated and contracted growers (EurepGAP, n.d). 
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suffering from inability to reach the quality standards. Approximately 840 hectares of the gold 
cultivar are currently planted for commercial purpose in Italy, USA, Chile, Japan, France and 
Korea. Trial plantings have also been established in Australia and China (Zespri, 2004-2005).   
 
In efforts to develop a twelve-month supply system for ZESPRI’s green and gold varieties, Italy 
has been selected as a major partner. In the season of 2005-06 Italy produced two million trays 
of green kiwifruit and 1.2 million trays of gold kiwifruit for the account of ZESPRI (Belrose Inc, 
2006). 
 
ZESPRI is taking advantage of its premium brand by planting high quality fruit in other 
countries and thereby securing supply from those ZESPRI plantings when kiwifruit will not be 
available from New Zealand. Other marketers have duplicated this strategy of essentially 
supplying the market with more fruit from a single brand than what is provided at the moment. 
Their challenge is consequently to ensure that there is a sufficient demand among consumers to 
meet the extra supplies. 
 
In 2006, ZESPRI announced their ability to export their gold variety from New Zealand between 
June and August and from Italy between December and January. The gaps in between will be 
filled by exports from Chile, where ZESPRI recently started growing gold (Freshinfo, 2006).  
 
 
Aragorn 
 
Aragorn is the processing subsidiary of ZESPRI, formed in 2002 (Gardiner, 2004), which 
focuses on transforming particularly gold kiwifruit. Aragorn is not part of the fresh whole fruit 
programmes of ZESPRI. The company processes kiwifruit into food ingredients and 
preparations. Aragorn will remain a unit under development over the next couple of years, 
concentrating on growing the markets in Europe and Asia. In these markets, ingredients 
developed by Aragorn have been mainly used in dairy, beverage and dessert products (Zespri, 
2004-2005). 
 
 
Taste Japan 
 
The importance of taste in consumer preference and repeat purchase levels has long been 
advocated by marketers and reinforced through consumer research. Such research conducted on 
the Japanese market some years ago clearly demonstrated that Japanese consumers prefer high 
dry matter fruit and were also willing to pay more for taste (McAneney, n.d.). Dry matter 
strongly influences the taste of the fruit and is defined by the ratio of dry weight to fresh weight 
of the fruit (Zespri, 2005). These specific consumer preferences were clearly supported by a 50 
percent decline in exported volumes of the green kiwifruit over the last decade (from 15 to 7.4 
million trays in 2001) (McAneney, n.d.). Japan is an important and valuable market for ZESPRI. 
As the highest earning market in the world they are willing to pay premium price for kiwifruit 
(Zespri, 2004) and should therefore be considered a significant source of profit. The Japanese 
taste issues gave rise to founding the programme Taste Japan, which was implemented in 2001. 
Research proved that Japanese kiwifruit consumers would pay 12 percent more in sales price for 
an extra one percent improvement in dry matter. Research was carried out to establish the 
relationship between dry matter levels and orchard management and subsequently provide 
guidelines of how to improve dry matter content. It was confirmed that dry matter is influenced 
by the supply of carbohydrates, which for example depends on the amount of sunlight captured 
(Zespri, 2005). Under this programme, kiwifruit growers that manage to grow high quality fruit 
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are rewarded with a payment premium (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2004). ZESPRI 
aims to increase the dry matter content of the entire kiwifruit crop in New Zealand by 
encouraging growers to apply growing programmes maximising dry matter content (USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service, 2005). 
 
Taste issues in 2004 seem to have been partially solved in 2005, when total volumes sold in 
Japan reached almost 16 million trays. In 2004, ZESPRI expanded its program to other markets, 
including Korea, Taiwan and China, by introducing the Taste Zespri campaign (Zespri, 2004-
2005).  
 
Thus far, the history and development of the New Zealand kiwifruit industry has been described. 
A number of historical global and domestic events and ‘shocks’ have played a significant role in 
shaping the nature of the New Zealand kiwifruit sector. Today, New Zealand enjoys a price 
premium advantage on the world market that can be explained and justified through industry 
specific strategies and a well-developed production management system. 
 
 
2.2. Overview of New Zealand and world markets 
 
2.2.1. Size of global market 
 
Two thirds of the total world production of kiwifruit enters the global market and relatively few 
main players account for the vast bulk of international trade in kiwifruit. The OECD member 
countries accounted for almost 85 percent of world imports of kiwifruit in 2004 (Belrose Inc, 
2006) and world exports are currently dominated by Italy (35 percent), New Zealand (32 
percent) and Chile (15 percent) (HortResearch, 2005). All players in the international 
marketplace are highly influenced by and dependent on circumstances and trends in the 
individual markets. 
Figure 2: Top ten kiwifruit producing countries 2003-05  
China 23%
New Zealand 20%
Italy 28%
Chile 10%
South Korea 1%
Japan 3%
USA 2%
France 5%
Iran 1%
Greece 3%
Others 4%
  
Graphic: (HortResearch, 2006) 
 
The world’s three largest producers have until recently been Italy, New Zealand and Chile. 
China has overtaken Chile and New Zealand in the production stakes, but the original three 
countries are currently still the three largest exporters and account for more than 80 percent of 
total global exports. Since China has a relatively large domestic market to supply, the country’s 
future potential on the export market is yet unknown (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
Italy 28% 
China 23% 
New Zealand 
20% 
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Italy and New Zealand have constantly been the top two exporters. Since the 1992-93 season 
Italy has been leading the exports in ten seasons and New Zealand in five. Italy’s exports 
exceeded New Zealand’s until 2004, when New Zealand supplied the global market with more 
kiwifruit than Italy. The third largest exporter, Chile, has produced a stable and slightly 
increasing export volume. Iran’s export volumes have grown from a small base to become the 
world’s fourth largest exporter in 2004. Greece’s exports have fluctuated significantly over the 
recent years due to poor weather conditions affecting the crop and subsequently export numbers. 
Three other export countries, France, the United States and Spain, have presented relatively 
stable statistics from 1999 and onwards. China has grown from providing the global market with 
insignificant numbers of fruit to become the second largest producer and the ninth largest 
exporter in the world in the 2003-05 period (Belrose Inc, 2006). In 2005, all three major 
exporters sent most of their exports to the European market (EU-15), yet differed in their second 
most significant export market. Italy focused on the rest of Europe and Russia, whereas New 
Zealand and Chile concentrated on the Asian market and North America respectively (Belrose 
Inc, 2007).  
 
 
2.2.2. EU’s role in world trade 
 
Out of the producing and exporting countries in the EU, Italy has always been, and remains, the 
largest kiwifruit producing nation with a significant influence on the world market. The EU also 
constitutes the largest consuming market in the world. 
 
Italy is the leading supplier of kiwifruit on the international market. Italy’s kiwifruit marketing 
strategy differs considerably from the one in New Zealand and is performed by numerous 
organisations of different structures and sizes. Since there are no trade barriers within the 
European Union, Italy’s domestic market effectively consists of 460 million European citizens. 
This can be seen as an immediate advantage, but Italy has also encountered some difficulties in 
applying a nationwide control over exported volumes and quality. This is a concern that the 
centralised New Zealand system controls better. To increase its competitiveness, Italy has 
recently invested in improving every stage of the supply chain through introducing the latest 
technology, strong brands, new varieties and forming alliances with suppliers in other countries 
such as France and Chile (Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
Italy experienced a large over-supply in the 2004-05 season, which resulted in the price of Italian 
fruit falling by over 30 percent on the European market. This issue had large implications on the 
entire international kiwifruit industry and illustrates the impact and important role of Italian 
circumstances internationally. Italy’s latest contribution to new kiwifruit varieties is the 
Summerkiwi cultivar. This fruit can be harvested up to 40 days before the Hayward variety, 
which provides Italy with the opportunity to supply the world market with fruit earlier than 
relevant competitors (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
 
 
2.2.3. China’s role in world trade 
 
While the rest of the world has steadily increased kiwifruit plantings, China has increased 
kiwifruit production more than tenfold over the past decade. In 1999, the total production of 
kiwifruit from China reached 165,000 metric tonnes and was estimated to have reached 400,000 
metric tonnes per year by 2006. If productivity approaches the level of other countries, Chinese 
annual production could potentially reach 700 000 metric tonnes per year (Huang and Ferguson, 
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2001). Currently, almost all domestically produced kiwifruit is sold within the country and 
between one fifth and one third is being processed. Exports presently account for only two 
percent, a number that is likely to change as existing orchards mature (Huang and Ferguson, 
2002). China is facing a few challenges mainly concerning quality issues and coordination of 
marketing and production (Huang and Ferguson, 2001). The country also needs to be prepared 
for a significant production expansion within the next few years and consequently improve 
present storage and transport facilities (Belrose Inc, 2006). Another issue concerns planting more 
commercially demanded varieties. At present, the Chinese kiwifruit industry produces varieties 
that are not as desirable to either Chinese or international consumers (Huang and Ferguson, 
2001). Even though the Hayward variety has not been extensively planted in China, the country 
is still the world’s fourth largest producer of the variety, which could have a significant impact 
on world trade as more Hayward orchards are being planted (Huang and Ferguson, 2002). 
 
Chinese kiwifruit production did not become globally significant until the late 1990s and is 
growing rapidly (with production more than trebling since 1999). In 2003-2005 official statistics 
positioned China as the second largest producing country in the world. The industry concentrates 
on supplying the domestic market first of all and then on export markets. Only small volumes 
have been exported to Asian markets and some trial shipments have been sent to European and 
North American markets (Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
The industry faces two main obstacles to exporting its kiwifruit. Firstly, the majority of 
commercial plantings are of less desirable varieties (not Hayward). Secondly, the production is 
divided among many small sections managed by individual farmers. This has caused difficulties 
in controlling the chemical use and compliance with quality requirements (Belrose Inc, 2006).   
 
Several indicators suggest that trade (both imports and exports) of kiwifruit with China could 
grow rapidly over the next couple of years. Since the country previously managed to solve the 
quality problems facing the apple and pear industries (Belrose Inc, 2006), it is likely to perform 
similarly in the kiwifruit industry. The effects of both increased economic standards and the 
rapid spread of supermarket chains are likely to create a strong Chinese demand for supplies of 
fresh fruit all year around (Belrose Inc, 2006). This could potentially benefit New Zealand, from 
where China imports several thousand tonnes of kiwifruit annually already (Huang and 
Ferguson, 2001).  
 
China has invested in several breeding programmes, focusing on new varieties suitable to the 
Chinese growing conditions. These have resulted in two new cultivars; the Jintao, which is more 
or less equivalent to the New Zealand gold variety and commercialised in Italy, and the Red Sun; 
with hairless green skin, yellow flesh and red locules. The latter variety is expected to reach 
production of commercial levels in 2007 (Belrose Inc, 2006). Since the Jintao variety is notably 
similar to the New Zealand gold variety, they could be seen as direct competitors for the same 
market shares. Even if New Zealand enjoys plant variety rights to the gold variety, and the Gold 
and Jintao are hence not completely substitutable, they will still both be considered as golden 
kiwifruit in this research. 
 
 
2.2.4. Other main players 
 
Chile 
 
The kiwifruit industry of this South American country was profoundly damaged in the 1980s by 
an overexpansion that led to a stagnated production in the 1990s. The plantings expanded again 
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in the early years of the new millennium. Chile carries out marketing through a number of 
exporting firms, like the Italians, and in the 2005 shipping season exports from 128 different 
companies were identified (Belrose Inc, 2006). The larger export companies have allied with 
Northern hemisphere traders and established marketing and promotion contracts with major 
retailers  (Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
Chile is currently striving to get the domestic quality standards, Chilgap, recognised as 
equivalent to EurepGAP and thereby upgrade the country’s international competitiveness. The 
Chilean government has also aggressively pursued free trade agreements with countries 
worldwide over the last couple of years to improve market access of Chilean fruits (Belrose Inc, 
2006). Chile is still the third largest exporter of kiwifruit, but for how much longer is unclear, 
since China appears to have the capability to compete for international market share.    
 
 
France 
 
Many small producers form the French kiwifruit industry and the export marketing is divided 
between four large exporting firms. Just like Italy, France benefits from the geographical 
advantage of having the largest consuming countries as neighbours within the EU, thereby facing 
zero tariffs into these key markets. The country remains vulnerable to competition from Italy and 
was heavily affected by the Italian expansion in the 2004-05 season. France is currently the 
world’s sixth largest exporter (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
 
 
Greece 
 
Due to several years of crop failures starting in 2001, Greece lost its position as an important 
player on the European market. However, the country regained its status in 2004, unfortunately 
concurrent with the excess supply in the Italian market sold at minimum price. Due to relatively 
low production costs Greece managed to survive the setback and maintain access to the markets 
in Eastern Europe and in Russia. Consumers in these countries and domestically are increasingly 
demanding higher quality food products, due to advancing economic standards. This puts severe 
pressure on the Greek kiwifruit industry and in order to maintain its market share in those 
countries fruit quality needs to be improved to meet demand (Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
 
The United States 
 
Kiwifruit plants were originally exported to the United States from New Zealand. The first 
commercial grower was established in 1960 in California, the state where 95 percent of total 
U.S. kiwifruit production is represented (California Kiwifruit Commission, 2000). In 2005, the 
domestic kiwifruit crop had increased with 55 percent compared to the last season. This new 
situation introduces the country to challenges of both increasing domestic consumption and 
expanding exports. Since the country recently increased its awareness and concerns regarding 
health, diet and obesity matters, the kiwifruit industry should have an essential message to get 
across (Belrose Inc 2006). Domestic marketing and promotion efforts should focus on and 
emphasise the unique health benefits of the kiwifruit (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
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2.2.5. Trade restrictions 
 
International trade in kiwifruit is currently distorted by several measures. Import tariffs constitute 
the most common trade restriction, and are imposed by several major importing countries. China 
imposes a relatively high import tariff of 20 percent (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2006), although it is possible that these tariffs may be reduced on New Zealand imports once the 
near-complete New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement is concluded. Kiwifruit imports to the 
United States and the EU face tariffs of 8.5 percent and 8 percent respectively (European 
Commission 2006), (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, n.d.). Japan’s import tariff reaches 6.5 
percent (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2000). Other countries with high import tariffs 
include Taiwan (25 percent) (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 2003) and South Korea 
(46.5 percent) (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 2003). The latter two will not be 
considered in this research due to their relative insignificance on the international market. 
    
Another commonly exercised non-tariff policy falls under the classification of a Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) measure, established by the WTO. This is an agreement recognising what 
measures a government can execute in order to protect domestic animal and plant health and 
food safety (World Trade Organisation, 2005). According to Voss (2005), these are very 
efficient measures in order to prevent substandard kiwifruit from entering currently health aware 
and environmentally and safety concerned markets and are the reason for several trade disputes 
in progress. Biosecurity policies are common SPS measures. Biosecurity is a major issue for 
isolated islands and countries as Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Although their isolation acts 
as a natural deterrent to biosecurity risks, these countries also actively protect and control against 
several pests and diseases in order to avoid the potentially severe economic consequences that 
the introduction of these might have on their domestic agricultural industries (Anderson, 2004). 
 
An example of such SPS non-tariff barriers is the introduction of a stricter phytosanitary measure 
in Japan, which was executed through increased fumigation of imported New Zealand organic 
kiwifruit at the Japanese border (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2002). New Zealand has, 
since 2000, had ongoing disputes with Japan concerning the trade restriction targeting imported 
organic kiwifruit. These measures were argued to comply with the regulations established in the 
SPS agreement within the WTO and Japan fumigated imported commodities more frequently 
than other WTO members (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 2002). In order to avoid any 
possible risks Japan chose to fumigate large imported shipments, and according to New Zealand 
(2002), routinely started fumigating imports that even contained insect species already present in 
the country (New Zealand Fruitgrowers Federation, 2002). 
 
 
2.2.6. New Zealand production trends 
 
The kiwifruit industry in New Zealand was the earliest and among the most proactive players to 
position itself on the global market. The country is consequently the second largest producer and 
exporter of kiwifruit today. From starting out as an insignificant source of returns/investment in 
the early 1970’s, the New Zealand kiwifruit industry expanded dramatically to become a highly 
important agricultural sector and the sixth largest export earner in 1991 (HortResearch, 2005) 
and subsequently the most valuable horticultural exporter in 2007 (NZ$790 million) (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2007). Marketing and exports are carried out by the single desk seller Zespri Ltd. 
This constitutes a significant advantage to New Zealand, through the combination of resources 
and marketing efforts. The New Zealand strategy is also subject to ongoing trade disputes within 
the World Trade Organisation, where it is considered by some WTO members as a State Trading 
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Enterprise and hence a trade distorting measure that may be subject to removal as multilateral 
trade negotiations progress. 
 
 
Trends by variety 
 
The Green kiwifruit variety remains the most widely produced and consumed kiwifruit variety. 
By 1997 all New Zealand kiwifruit was grown under either KiwiGreen or organic production 
systems. Plantings have been established overseas in order to ensure a twelve month supply of 
New Zealand kiwifruit. Most of these orchards (mainly in Italy) are joint ventures between New 
Zealand supplier groups and overseas landowners (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2006). 
 
The volumes in the organic kiwifruit sector remains steady despite a few issues smaller fruit size 
and more significant yield fluctuations. The organic grower returns for the 2005 crop was 
NZ$1.88/tray higher than for Green kiwifruit (NZ$5.46/tray)  (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2006). Through extensive market research the programme Taste Japan has aimed at 
increasing sales of kiwifruit on the Japanese market. The strategy implemented to reach this goal 
includes increasing the dry matter content of the kiwifruit crop. Growers are encouraged to do so 
through higher returns of fruit with dry matter (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). 
 
The Gold kiwifruit sector is expanding more than the other varieties and, as mentioned earlier, 
overseas plantings have been established of this variety as well (Freshinfo, 2006). For Gold 
kiwifruit the grower returns for the 2005 crop was NZ$2/tray higher than for Green kiwifruit at 
NZ$5.46/tray (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). The plant variety rights and 
brand name are owned by ZESPRI, which makes it impossible for competitors to replicate. 
However, it does not prevent them from inventing other new varieties that could compete for the 
same market share. Research and breeding programmes like these are being carried out in both 
Italy and China, where new cultivars have also been developed (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
 
 
Change in export markets 
 
As outlined above, traditional kiwifruit producers and exporters such as Italy, New Zealand and 
Chile are facing significant changes in global market conditions. The most fundamental 
challenge for these countries is the rapidly increasing global supply of kiwifruit and the potential 
for losses in market shares as other producers such as China become more prominent. In 
addition, the global marketplace for soft fruits more generally is becoming increasingly crowded 
– creating additional competition for kiwifruit exporters. It is argued that the global kiwifruit 
industry should focus on marketing and promotion in both its traditional rich country markets 
and newer emerging country markets (Belrose Inc, 2006) in order to remain competitive and 
profitable. 
 
With China as an upcoming competitor on the world market, the distribution of market shares 
among current players are most likely to change. China has already passed New Zealand’s 
production statistics and indications suggest that the country’s role as an exporter will increase 
significantly as well. This will subsequently affect New Zealand’s market share in current export 
markets. 
 
Countries such as Chile (New Zealand’s most noteworthy competitor in the Southern 
hemisphere) are currently undergoing free trade negotiations with several countries. Free trade 
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agreements that give New Zealand’s competitors preferential market access to significant 
kiwifruit consuming markets could potentially damage New Zealand export returns.  
 
Intense New Zealand marketing has been carried out in important export markets. Taste Japan 
has already proven successful in Japan where ZESPRI’s market research and marketing efforts 
have resulted in significantly higher volumes sold. The campaign has therefore continued in 
other countries as well (Zespri, 2004-2005).  
 
 
2.2.7. Producer price for exporters 
 
Out of the net exporting countries, New Zealand is currently the country that enjoys the highest 
producer price on all varieties. These prices include the premiums that the New Zealand 
industry, due to several industry developed advantages (such as KiwiGreen, the twelve moth 
supply system and plant variety rights of Golden kiwifruit), can add to a regular price. Because 
of the higher premiums, New Zealand has always been the country other exporters compare their 
price standards against (Belrose Inc, 2006). Italian producers have received a relatively lower 
price than New Zealand in 11 years out of 15 between 1990 and 2004. Italian producers were 
hence price leaders for four of these years. New Zealand has managed to maintain the price 
premium, despite the higher transfer costs New Zealand suffers in order to reach the Northern 
hemisphere. U.S. prices have struggled to keep a high level over the past decades and did not 
reach acceptable levels until 2003, after a gradual increase from the lowest levels in 1992. 
Greece targets most kiwifruit exports towards lower-income markets, which consequently affects 
the level of prices received by producers. Chile is another significant exporting country which 
also faces high transfer costs to the Northern Hemisphere. The producer prices in Chile have 
always been lower compared to both Italy and New Zealand and constitutes almost as little as a 
tenth of New Zealand’s producer price in 2003 (Belrose Inc, 2006). The values for producer 
prices in 2003 reflect the price levels for different varieties and different countries. The position 
of the different countries relative to each other, in terms of producer prices, gives an indication 
of the price situation for most years (not just 2003). See appendix for further information on 
basedata for all countries in 2003.  
  
Table 1: Producer prices for net exporters in 2003 
 Producer price (US$) 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Greece Chile 
Green 1715 1115 677 128 
Gold 2120 1438 874 165 
Green organic 2141 1572 955 180 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2006). 
 
 
Quantities for exporters 
 
As mentioned earlier, significant world production of kiwifruit is carried out in a few countries. 
These producers (apart from China) heavily dom inate foreign trade as well. Quantities produced 
and distributed on the world market have increased steadily over time, with a few exceptions of 
dramatic seasonal peaks. Some years’ unexpected increased production subsequently affected 
world prices significantly. See appendix for further information on the base data for all countries 
in 2003. 
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Table 2: Quantities produced for net exporters in 2003 
 Quantities produced (metric tonnes) for net exporters 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Chile Greece 
Green 261 323 125 60 
Gold 31 0 0 0 
Green organic 8 16 6 3 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2006). 
 
 
Table 3: Quantities traded for net exporters in 2003 
 Quantity traded (metric tonnes) for net exporters 
Varieties New Zealand Italy Chile Greece 
Green 237 208 111 15 
Gold 31 -2 0 0 
Green organic 7 -6 6 2 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (2006). 
 
New Zealand appears to be most dependent on trade out of the net exporting countries as 237 out 
of 261 metric tonnes of green kiwifruit contributes to exports. Italy is the largest producer but 
consumes about one third of its produced green kiwifruit domestically. Chile does not produce as 
much, but is also heavily dependent on exports. 
 
 
2.3. Key current and future market drivers 
 
The global kiwifruit industry is undergoing changes on both the demand and supply sides and 
some of the issues will be further discussed in the following section.  
 
 
2.3.1. Supply side 
 
Some countries are now implementing a variety of strategies to prepare for increasing global 
supplies and to address the threat of losing global market shares. Unless carefully managed, 
some of these strategies may create further demand/supply imbalances, at least in the short-term, 
and the industry needs to take caution in order to avoid these problems.  
 
New Zealand and Italy have initiated growing programmes in foreign countries in order to secure 
a twelve-month supply of products with their brand. With many different marketers now 
following similar strategies, the effect will be increased global supply of kiwifruit in every 
month of the year. 
 
Italy has recently commercialised the Summerkiwi variety, which can be harvested long before 
the Hayward. This could give a timing advantage before competitors but there might be an issue 
with early supplies simply adding to the overlap of supplies between the Northern and the 
Southern hemisphere. With more kiwifruit on the market, the prices will drop causing reduced 
returns for the global industry. 
 
The most fundamental challenge the industry will be confronted by shortly is the increasing 
global supply of not only kiwifruit, but also of other competing fruits. It is argued that the global 
kiwifruit industry should focus on marketing and promotion in both its traditional rich country 
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markets and newer emerging country markets (Belrose Inc, 2006). As mentioned earlier, China 
constitutes the country with the most potential to increase the supply of Green kiwifruit on the 
world market in the nearest future. 
 
Not only is total supply expected to increase, but productivity and technological improvements 
are most likely to improve as well. This is currently being experienced in most producing 
countries. 
 
The import tariff is still the most widely applied trade restriction within the kiwifruit industry. 
However, other non-tariff trade barriers such as the SPS measure are becoming more commonly 
used and one of the focus points of this research will be how a potential introduction of such a 
trade barrier would affect the New Zealand kiwifruit industry. 
 
The major retailers now dominate the food distribution system. This brings into question whether 
multiple players can continue to operate effectively in the supply chain. Retailers require 
continuous communication between them and the supplier and the existence of numerous players 
in the market makes this more difficult. The competition is tough and the marketers increasingly 
need to confirm to retailers the ability to build enough cooperation and communication into the 
present supply system in order to become the preferred supplier (Belrose Inc, 2006). 
 
There are also domestic industry structure challenges for the New Zealand kiwifruit industry at 
the moment. First of all there are an increasing number of corporations working as intermediate 
suppliers to ZESPRI. These are constantly growing and there are presently negotiations in 
progress between two of the largest supplier cooperatives, Satara and EastPack, to merge and 
thereby create the largest kiwifruit packing and cool storage business in the country (Freshinfo, 
2006). As these companies become larger, it is possible that some of them may seek to extend 
their own access to international markets, rather than selling through ZESPRI. ZESPRI is 
therefore under constant pressure to perform better than potential substitutes for growers 
(Belrose Inc, 2006).  
 
A considerable risk to intellectual property rights owned by ZESPRI is China’s use of illegal use 
of counterfeit labels. The ZESPRI label has been copied and put on Chinese kiwifruit in certain 
domestic markets. The counterfeit attempts are of concern for both Golden and Green kiwifruit. 
Commercial plantings of Gold kiwifruit in China will consequently not commence until local 
Chinese laws are able to protect the intellectual property rights (HortNews, 2004). 
 
Some of these trends and challenges are not necessarily specific to the kiwifruit sector. They also 
apply to other horticultural sectors, and are perhaps best addressed through joint action and 
global cooperation. This has recently been recognised by the fresh apple and pear industries in 
the Southern hemisphere where, following a significant downturn, better sharing of information 
now benefits all global players (Belrose Inc 2006). The kiwifruit industry has so far not 
experienced the very severe conditions faced by the apple and pear industries, but the indicators 
are identical; increased supplies and increased power of retailers and distributors (Dalgety, 
2003). 
 
 
2.3.2. Demand side 
 
Trends in consumption are changing globally. Consumers demand not only products that benefit 
health, but also products that have been produced in an environmentally friendly manner. The 
market therefore puts pressure on producers to implement strategies and production systems that 
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minimise the negative affect on the environment. Terms such as carbon footprints, food miles 
and sustainability work as incentives for producing countries to continuously perform better.  
 
Producers also need to respond to the higher demand of product diversity and the constant 
demand for novelties and substitutes to current commodities. Research and breeding 
programmes are being developed worldwide in kiwifruit producing countries to meet consumer 
preferences. New Zealand, Italy, China and Chile belong to the world’s top producers and have 
all recently developed new varieties that differ from each other.  
 
Multilateral and regional trade liberalisation is also of current interest of many countries relevant 
to kiwifruit trade. New Zealand and China are currently taking part in negotiations regarding a 
Free Trade Agreement. Chile, New Zealand’s direct competitor, is another country currently 
seeking new trade partners after signing an Association Agreement with the EU in 2002 
(European Commission, 2004).  
 
The second reason why the New Zealand kiwifruit sector may face significant change is due to 
the nature of its single desk seller structure. ZESPRI, with its single point of entry system, has 
been mentioned in multilateral trade liberalisation negotiations within the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Some countries, such as the United States, regard the single point of entry 
strategy as being discriminatory and trade distorting and consider that it should be made illegal 
under the WTO trading rules6.  
 
 
2.4. Conclusion of chapter 
 
New Zealand was the first country to start growing and selling kiwifruit commercially. This chapter 
has examined the formation and early development of the New Zealand kiwifruit industry. It 
describes how it endured the deregulation of the agricultural sector in the 1980s and how other 
economic factors affected the industry. It goes through how the development and improvement of 
the New Zealand industry structure has lead to the establishment of ZESPRI. Recent strategies have 
differentiated New Zealand as an innovative market player that enjoys price premiums on all 
exported kiwifruit. 
 
The main issues for New Zealand consist of production threats from China, both in terms of 
increasing quantity and varieties; trade restrictions such as SPS measures and a potential loss of the 
single desk seller structure. This chapter introduced the development of the global industry and its 
challenges ahead. The global kiwifruit market is changing rapidly on both the demand and supply 
sides, and is therefore a good candidate for further qualitative and empirical investigation. The 
following chapter will provide an understanding of the underlying trade theory and how it explains 
the potential issues. 
                                                          
6 However, at the time of writing, the outcomes of current WTO negotiations are unclear. It is possible that the 
negotiations may go “on hold” for a period of time, in which case, the immediate pressure on ZESPRI may be 
delayed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2007). 
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3. Trade theory: Theoretical framework 
 
Countries may choose to participate in international trade because of the following two reasons: 
non-availability of factors of production (natural resources) and demand for product 
differentiation (different quality) (Gandolfo, 1998). The reasons clearly contribute to the gains 
from trade and explain how the countries benefit from free trade rather than autarky. The 
following section on the theory of trade will elaborate the issue and explain how and why 
countries gain from trade.  
 
 
3.1. Theory of trade 
 
3.1.1. Mercantilism   
 
The first economic philosophy of mercantilism was established as some European countries 
developed into modern nations where trade had a significant importance and value. The core of 
this theory was essentially that a country could become rich and powerful by exporting more 
than it imported. Mercantilists also supported strict government control on all economic 
activities by encouraging national output and employment through restricted imports and 
stimulated exports. The export surplus would be exchanged for precious metals such as gold and 
silver, which were considered real national wealth indicators. This theory implied that a country 
only could gain from trade at the expense of another, since it is impossible for all trading 
countries to have an export surplus. Because mercantilism advocated economic nationalism and 
severe government regulation the early theory was to become heavily criticised by several trade 
economists in the following centuries (Salvatore, 1999). 
 
 
3.1.2. Adam Smith 
 
Adam Smith (1776) established in The Wealth of Nations that countries would gain from shifting 
from a situation in autarky to free trade. His argument was based on the law of absolute 
advantage, which suggests that if a country has an absolute cost advantage in the production of 
one commodity and the other country has an absolute cost advantage in the production of the 
other, both countries would gain from free trade if specialising in the production thereof and 
subsequently exporting these commodities (Gandolfo, 1998). 
 
 
3.1.3. Ricardo 
 
In 1817 David Ricardo published the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, where the 
trade law of absolute advantage was developed into the law of comparative advantage. The law 
of comparative advantage was first illustrated as a two-nation, two-commodity world and 
demonstrates how a country could gain from trade through specialising in the production of the 
commodity in which it is relatively cost efficient compared to the other country. This country 
would subsequently export the commodity in which it has a lower opportunity cost and import 
the commodity in which it does not. Opportunity cost is defined as the value of other potential 
options given up for a certain alternative (Seitz, Nelson and Halcrow, 1994). The theory also 
assumes, given one country has a comparative advantage in producing one commodity, that the 
other country consequently must have a comparative advantage in producing the other 
commodity. This differs from Smith’s principle of absolute advantage: even if a country has an 
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absolute disadvantage in producing both commodities, it can still be beneficial for that country to 
specialise in the production of the least inefficiently produced commodity. Both countries are 
hence better off specialising in their comparatively advantageous commodity, even if one 
country enjoys absolute advantage in the production of both commodities. Ricardo explained his 
theory through the difference in labour productivity and that countries engage in trade because of 
different levels of technology (Salvatore, 2005).   
 
J.S. Mill (1848) developed the equation of international demand, with which it is possible to 
calculate the terms of trade by establishing that the value of exports from one country equals the 
value of imports of another country. The value of supply and demand will therefore adjust to 
equalise and represent each other. This was further elaborated by Alfred Marshall (1879) in his 
theory of international reciprocal demand, by which he introduced the graphic illustration and 
tool of Marshallian offer curves, or supply and demand curves, to graphically indicate the 
different terms of trade (Gandolfo, 1998).  
 
 
3.1.4. Heckscher-Ohlin 
 
The previous section explained classical theory through international differences in comparative 
advantage. The reason why these characteristics appear was further developed by Eli Heckscher 
and Bertil Ohlin. They established that the comparative advantage of a country, and thus trade, 
originates from different factor endowments, by assuming a market with two commodities, two 
countries and two factors of production (Krauss and Johnson, 1974). The book Interregional and 
International Trade, published in 1933 (Salvatore 1999), presents an extension of standard trade 
theory. The fundamental assumptions behind this theory are that factors of production are 
immobile between countries (mobile between industries though) and that these factors are used 
differently in the production of two different commodities. The difference in technology between 
countries is explained by different levels of capital (Leamer, 1987). The core of the general 
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory was further developed and explained in four different theorems; 
the H-O theorem, which predicts the patterns of trade; the factor price equalisation theorem, 
which explains the effect of international trade on factor prices; the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, 
which states the relationship between changed production and real returns; and the Rybczynski 
theorem illustrating the impact a change in factor endowment will have on output (Leamer, 
1987). 
 
The first theorem, according to Heckscher and Ohlin, seeks to explain the reason behind 
comparative advantages by suggesting that a country will use its relatively abundant resource to 
produce and subsequently export a commodity. The commodity that requires the intensive use of 
the relatively expensive and scarce factor of production will consequently be imported. This 
theorem thus develops the classical theory of comparative advantage by explaining trade patterns 
and relative commodity prices through the physical availability of factor endowments among 
nations. The theorem is therefore often referred to as the factor-proportions or factor-endowment 
theory and also emphasises the differences between commodities through the intensities of 
which these factors are used (Salvatore, 2005).  
 
The factor price equalisation theorem, developed by Lerner and Samuelson, states that 
international trade will contribute to an equalisation of homogenous factor prices across trading 
nations. The theorem thus proves that as trade expands the difference is reduced between wages 
of the same type of labour and earnings of the same type of capital (Salvatore, 2005).  
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The Stolper-Samuelson theorem describes how a rise in the relative price of one commodity will 
increase the real returns of the factor that is used intensively in the production of that 
commodity. This will consequently lead to a decrease of real returns of the other production 
factor (Choi et al. 2003). Real returns, influenced by free international trade, will therefore 
increase in the factor used intensively in production and decrease in the factor of production used 
less intensively. 
 
The Rybczynski theorem assumes production of two goods under constant factor and commodity 
prices. This implies that an increase in one factor endowment will consequently increase the 
production of the commodity in which that factor is used and decrease the output of the other 
commodity. So, an increase in a factor endowment generally causes one industry to expand at the 
expense of the other (industry) (Choi and Hartigan,  2003).  
 
The assumptions behind Ricardian theory are rather restrictive and the theory of comparative 
advantage is limited in terms of immobile factors of production between countries. The H-O 
theory is similarly restricted utilising the same assumptions. Despite these restrictive 
assumptions the H-O theory still belongs to one of the most dominant frameworks for analysing 
trade. However, the assumptions changed over time in order to facilitate the development of 
further trade theories, which are often referred to as the neoclassical theories.  
 
 
3.1.5. Modern trade theories 
 
The fundamental assumptions of classical trade theory include perfect competition and 
homogenous commodities across countries. However, reality illustrates an opposite situation 
where commodities are differentiated and market structures diverge from the theory of perfect 
competition by being based on structures such as monopolistic competition and oligopoly 
(Gandolfo, 1998).  
 
Falvey (1981) developed a theory based on vertical differentiation, which explained how 
production is not homogenous, but that commodities differ in quality and consumers require 
different qualities based on their income level. The second point of this theory suggests that 
capital is specific to each industry, rather than homogenous, and because of its specificity also 
immobile (Gandolfo, 1998). The theory thus suggests that demand differs between countries and 
provided demand cannot be met with domestic production, a country is better off engaging in 
trade.  
 
Krugman (1979) developed the theory of horizontally differentiated goods, which refers to 
products of the same quality but with different characteristics that are valued differently among 
consumers. This theory is based on the assumption that consumers generally enjoy variety. This 
is explained in Barker’s (1977, cited in (Gandolfo, 1998)) variety hypothesis. He argues that “as 
real income increases, purchasers are enabled to buy more varieties of a product; and since a 
greater number of these extra varieties are available from abroad rather than at home, the share 
of imports in demand tends to increase”. The variety hypothesis originates from the theory of 
demand based on the characteristics of goods according to Lancaster (1966, 1971, cited in 
(Gandolfo, 1998)). This theory argues that the characteristics available are more relevant to the 
choice of consumers rather than the commodity itself.  
 
A theory explaining preferences, developed by Dixit, Stiglitz (1977, cited in (Gandolfo, 1998)) 
and Spence (1976, cited in (Gandolfo, 1998)), suggests that behind the demand for differentiated 
goods lies the attractiveness of variety as such. This implies that consumers prefer intermediate 
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combinations of all possible differentiated commodities. This theory has been used by Krugman 
to explain international trade in differentiated goods based on monopolistic competition (also 
neo-Chamberlinian monopolistic competition). It is observed that both approaches of 
differentiated products lead to an equilibrium of monopolistic competition, where different firms 
produce differentiated products and possess monopolistic power without necessarily earning 
monopolistic profits (Gandolfo, 1998). 
 
 
3.1.6. Porter  
 
Classical trade theory explains national success and trade flow based on factor endowments. 
However, classical trade theory was further developed by Michael Porter to explain how 
globalisation of competition and the power of technology also contributes to trade. He stresses 
the need for a new theory that explains “why a nation provides a favourable home base for 
companies that compete internationally”. This theory should also develop other motives but the 
cost theory to explain why companies in some nations are more successful to create  advantages 
based on quality, specific characteristics and product innovation (Porter, 1998). 
 
In The Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990), Porter argues that “national prosperity is 
created, not inherited” and that a country’s competitiveness is not created by or dependent on 
natural endowments, but rather on the capacity of its industry to improve and innovate. The 
theory of competitive advantage therefore differs from the classical theories of relative 
advantage and trade. Porter continues by claiming that companies benefit from competition and 
pressure from rival companies and that competitive success is gained through differences in 
national value, culture, government policy and history. These factors constitute the primary 
impacts on a nation’s productivity, and contribute to a more modern concept of competitiveness 
(Porter, 1998).  
 
 
3.2. The gains from trade 
 
Trade theory suggests that countries have the opportunity to specialise in the production of the 
commodity in which they are relatively efficient, export it and consequently import the 
commodity in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Specialisation therefore allows for 
both countries to reallocate resources into relatively efficient production. This efficiency implies 
that more commodities are produced and consumed under free trade rather than in a situation of 
self-sufficiency. 
 
The gains from trade can be demonstrated by depicting a production possibility frontier with an 
indifference curve and thereby representing both supply and demand, as in figure 1. The 
production possibility frontier illustrates the maximum production of two commodities with 
given resources and the indifference curve depicts the combination of commodities rendering a 
given level of utility. In autarky, the single country reaches equilibrium in point a, where the 
indifference curve (I1) is tangent to the production possibility frontier at the same point as the 
price line (P), which illustrates the relative price between the two commodities. In equilibrium 
the relative price hence equals the marginal rate of technical substitution (the slope of the price 
line) and the marginal rate of transformation (the slope of the production possibility frontier). 
This point demonstrates the maximum utility of consumers and the maximum profit of producers 
and thus the point where production equals consumption. The production possibility frontier is 
curved because of diminishing marginal returns (each additional unit of input yields a 
diminishing level of output) as the production inputs are substituted for each other (Salvatore, 
2005). 
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Figure 3: Single country in autarky  
 
Source: Salvatore (2005). 
 
By introducing a second country to trade with the first country, higher levels of production and 
consumption can potentially be reached. With trade, production increases in both countries, since 
it allows them to specialise in their relatively most efficient production. The production of the 
two countries is subsequently demonstrated by two different production possibility frontiers 
(PPFf and PPFc), due to relative efficiencies in different places, but since preferences are 
homogenous for both countries the same indifference curve applies. Because of different relative 
efficiencies, the countries move from the production points Pc1 and Pf1 to produce at the points 
Pc2 and Pf2 respectively, closer to complete specialisation, presenting two different price ratios. 
The indifference curve has shifted outwards (from I1 to I2) and the new common point of 
consumption is therefore determined by C’. With trade, only one price line appears (P’), tangent 
to the highest possible indifference, presenting the new international terms of trade. Both 
countries will conclusively benefit from trade in terms of more commodities and a higher utility 
(from I1 to I2) (Salvatore, 2005).  
 
Figure 4: Two countries trading 
 
Source: Salvatore, D. (2005). 
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As long as the international terms of trade are different compared to the autarky price ratio, the 
potential welfare of a country is higher with international trade than without it. The effect of 
trade is essentially to increase the price of exportable products and hence promote a reallocation 
of resources towards the relatively efficient industry and thereby raising the relative price of the 
factor used intensively in that production. The real income of that production factor is increased 
while the income of the factor used in production of the importable good is consequently 
reduced. Free trade can therefore be considered to benefit one factor of production while 
reducing production, and hence the factor of production, of the other. The change in social 
welfare determines to what extent a country is better or worse off in a situation with free 
international trade (Krauss and Johnson, 1974). 
 
 
3.3. Impact of trade restrictions in the kiwifruit market 
 
In previous sections the gains from free trade in terms of maximised world production and 
consumer utility have been discussed. Although free trade is argued to make countries better off, 
almost every country imposes some type of restriction on international trade. The following 
section will introduce some of the most commonly used restrictions within the global trade of 
kiwifruit and their general effect on the international market. A theoretical as well as a graphical 
analysis of how a restriction effects production, consumption and trade will be presented in each 
case. 
 
 
3.3.1. Tariffs 
 
The tariff is one of the most widely and historically used trade restrictions (Salvatore, 2005). 
Tariffs may be specific, ad valorem or compound. The specific tariff is introduced as a fixed 
amount of money on every traded unit, the ad valorem tariff is a fixed percentage on the value of 
the traded commodity, and the compound tariff is a combination of both (Salvatore, 2005). 
Imposing a tariff can be expressed by shifting the price in the market from free trade equilibrium, 
which is depicted in the following graph, where an import tariff is imposed by the importing 
country.  
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Figure 5: Global effect of an import tariff 
 
 
Source: Salvatore, D. (2005). 
 
Pe is the initial price in free trade equilibrium, which changes by the tariff and becomes Ptm in 
the importing country and Ptx in the exporting country. The price in the importing country 
increases with the tariff and decreases in the exporting country due to reduced excess demand 
(ED to ED’) for their commodity. The government gains revenue collected through the tariff. 
Production in the exporting country decreases from Qsx to Qsx’ (because of less exported 
products) and increases from Qsm to Qsm’ in the importing country (due to a less competitive 
domestic market). Consumption, on the other hand, increases in the exporting country from Qdx 
to Qdx’ (more commodities at a lower price) and decreases from Qdm to Qdm’ in the importing 
country (less commodities at a higher price).  
 
 
3.3.2. Sanitary and Phytosanitary policies 
 
International trade in kiwifruit is currently distorted by several measures. Import tariffs are still 
the most commonly exercised policy, but another import restriction that has been used more 
frequently falls under the classification of a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measure, as 
defined by the WTO (World Trade Organisation, 2005). The SPS Agreeement is an agreement 
recognising what measures a government can execute in order to protect domestic animal and 
plant health and food safety. Member countries of the WTO are allowed to set their own 
standards, provided that the regulations are scientifically justifiable. If countries use international 
standards, guidelines and directives, they should unlikely be challenged legally in a WTO 
dispute. Introducing an SPS policy may be legitimate when it is considered necessary to protect 
human, animal and plant life and health. The measure is considered inappropriate (or illegal) if it 
discriminates between countries with similar conditions and standards. If an exporting country 
can justify that health protecting measures applied to exports achieve the same level as in the 
importing country, the importing country is expected to accept the level of protection in the 
exporting country and hence accept imports (World Trade Organisation, 2005). According to 
Voss (2005), SPS measures are considered highly efficient in order to prevent kiwifruit below 
domestic standards from entering a health-aware and environmentally and safety concerned 
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market. Countries can use the measure to legally prevent substandard commodities from being 
imported. This could be relevant if imported kiwifruit proves to contain certain pests that are not 
domestically found or wanted or if pesticide levels prove to be too high for domestic standards. 
Issues like these are the reason for several trade disputes in progress.  
 
To satisfy WTO obligations, SPS measures have to be introduced based on scientific principles, 
but the temptation to use them illegitimately seems to have been expected from the first 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round (Anderson, 2004). Member states set their own appropriate 
protection levels and have the right to determine levels that are higher than international 
standards (Anderson, 2004). The policy itself could be executed as a restriction on imports and 
depicted as an import quota, imposing a limit on the amount that can be imported. Although an 
import quota is a quantitative restriction (on imports) and an import tariff is imposed as a price-
based measure their effects are similar in that they restrict supply to the domestic market. 
 
Figure 6: Global effect of an SPS measure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, 2007 
 
Producers in the importing country are better off, since the SPS policy restricts imports (from m 
to m’) and thereby protects domestic producers from international competition. Consumers in the 
importing country are worse off, due to fewer products at a higher price (PSPS). Consumers on 
the world market receive more products at a lower price (P’SPS). Producers in the exporting 
country suffer from reduced exports and hence lower returns.  
 
 
3.3.3. Supply increase 
 
Factors other than tariffs or other trade policies can impact the market, causing a new 
equilibrium to appear. Another trade-related issue concerning the global kiwifruit market is the 
consequence of a significant increase in production by a producing and exporting country. An 
increase in the volume of a major producing and exporting country will have a significant impact 
on the world price of the produced commodity, provided that the commodities from different 
producing countries are considered homogenous and that there is no change in demand. 
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Figure 7: Global effect of a supply increase 
 
 
Source: Own illustration, 2007 
 
Domestic consumers in the producing country are better off because of more products at a lower 
price. On one hand an increase in supply consequently reduces the world price (from Pw to Pw’), 
which could have a negative impact on producer surplus domestically. On the other hand, more 
exported products are demanded (x to x’), which improves the situation for domestic producers. 
Hence, producer welfare depends on by how much the price reduces. The consumers in the rest 
of the world are better off with more commodities at a lower price whereas producers suffer 
from the reduced market price because of more competition.  
 
Trade restrictions in the kiwifruit industry encompass more than just the tariffs and SPS 
measures focused on in this chapter, but quotas for example do not have a significant impact on 
the kiwifruit market (or for New Zealand exporters) and is therefore not further detailed in this 
research. Due to unavailability of data, subsidies and consumer support7 will also be excluded in 
this research. 
 
 
3.2. Conclusion of chapter 
 
The New Zealand kiwifruit industry, which is country reliant on trade, is currently challenged by 
several trade-related issues that may have a significant impact on the global market. The 
previous section reviewed the major and most common trade related issues impacting the global 
kiwifruit industry and applied trade theory to facilitate the comprehension of these threats and 
challenges. 
 
Some of the agricultural and trade policy issues will become more apparent in the nearest future 
and the risks, in terms of different trade restrictions, will be assessed through the development of 
potential scenarios and subsequently supported by a quantitative modelling analysis. The 
following chapter will include an assessment of the analytical framework relevant to this 
research and the selection of an appropriate approach. 
                                                          
7 Producer subsidies are excluded only due to lack of data, not because of insignificance to the industry; as producer 
and consumer supports most likely exist within the global kiwifruit industry.  
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4. Defining equilibrium theory:Analytical framework 
 
The previous section examined trade theory, the development thereof and finally the potential 
effects of trade. The analysis of the implications of trade related issues concerning the kiwifruit 
market on New Zealand producer returns require the application of an international trade model.  
 
Different endowments and consumer preferences are the main motives to why nations trade. It is 
thus possible to examine effects of trade related changes using an either general or partial 
equilibrium analysis of supply and demand. Following, a presentation of the two different 
equilibrium theories is given in order to compare and contrast the advantages and disadvantages 
with using either an economy-wide general equilibrium (GE) approach or a partial-economy 
partial equilibrium (PE) approach. Both frameworks seek to determine equilibrium prices and 
quantities on specific markets that are affected by different policy measures. The timeframe of 
the two approaches can vary from short-term to long-term and can specify a comparative static 
(at a certain point in time) or dynamic (process over time) solution (van Tongeren, van Meijl and 
Surry, 2000). 
 
 
4.1. General equilibrium theory 
 
GE theory aims to explain supply, demand and prices by examining the economy as a whole 
taking into account all interrelated segments and industry sectors as well as the flow of income 
and expenditure (van Tongeren, van Meijl and Surry, 2000). Since equilibrium in each market is 
determined by situations in other markets the establishment of one general equilibrium solution 
is analysed through a simultaneous determination of equilibria in all other markets (University of 
Melbourne Department of Economics 2000). The theory of general equilibrium was first 
established by Lèon Walras who, through Walras’ Law, explained that if one market is in 
equilibrium, the other markets must consequently be in equilibrium as well (Gandolfo, 1998). He 
also argued that a market cannot be in disequilibrium by itself without being matched by a 
disequilibrium in another market (University of Melbourne Department of Economics, 2000). 
 
Simple GE theory is necessarily based on some restrictive assumptions in order to simplify and 
facilitate the analysis. The theory assumes that factors of production are mobile between 
industries, but not between countries. It further assumes that players on the market are 
competitive and that technology is available and constant in all countries with production 
functions illustrating constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products8. To explain 
factor endowment and demand similarity, factor endowments vary across industries and 
consumption is maximised under identical utility functions (Leamer, 1987).  
 
 
                                                          
8 Although GE models have now been built that relax some of these assumptions including many that incorporate 
imperfect competition ( Francois, van Meijl et al. 2003).  
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4.2. Partial equilibrium theory 
 
Because the economy as a whole constitutes of so many different actors, factors and 
commodities a partial equilibrium approach is therefore also commonly and widely applied. In a 
PE analysis, attention is directed at a smaller number of variables directly affecting a market, or 
a group of related markets, while influences of other factors are generally ignored. An analysis 
based on a partial equilibrium approach can therefore be seen as a technique that simplifies an 
economy in general equilibrium (Simpson, 1975) and allows for the examination of commercial 
policy issues to be sectoral specific, relatively rapid and transparent (Francois and Hall, 1997). 
The theory of partial equilibrium also generally assumes a competitive world market, 
homogenous commodities and that technology is held constant (van Tongeren, van Meijl and 
Surry, 2000). 
 
Homogeneity and perfect competition simplify the practicality of trade modelling. The 
assumption of homogeneity implies that products are homogenous across markets and only one 
world price exists on the world market. When perfect competition is assumed the world market 
is divided into either importers or exporters for practical reasons. This enables tracing trade 
patterns at country and commodity level and hence facilitates an easier interpretation of the 
results (Cagatay and Saunders, 2003). By excluding intra-industry trade however, and limiting 
the analysis to net trade, partial models do not perfectly illustrate how countries interact (van 
Tongeren, van Meijl and Surry, 2000). 
 
In the economic literature, many different partial equilibrium models, specific to different 
purposes, can be found. Examples are the FAPRI model with a focus on the United States, the 
AGLINK model used by governments of OECD member countries, SWOPSIM developed by the 
USDA specifically for the Uruguay Round, GAPSI emphasising the EU, VOMM developed by 
the World Bank and WFM developed by the FAO (van Tongeren, van Meijl and Surry, 2000). 
 
 
There are several reasons for why a PE approach is considered the best option for the purpose of 
this research. A PE approach allows for much more product detail (such as different kiwifruit 
varieties) and a more specific trade policy analysis. The fact that there has been marginal 
research carried out in the kiwifruit industry concentrating on similar issues contributes to the 
aggregation problems of relevant data. Limited research time is also an issue and the collection 
of enough data for a GE approach would not be within the timeframe of the thesis. The 
unavailability of relevant data therefore means that a GE specification would be relatively 
unrealistic. However, the aim of this research is to address the sectoral effects of policy and 
market changes to a specific product, rather than economy wide impacts.  
 
 
4.3. Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter presented the analytical framework of this research. It investigated the main 
characteristics as well as the advantages and disadvantages of a general equilibrium and a partial 
equilibrium approach respectively. The area of application of this research is a detailed trade 
policy and market change analysis to specific countries for a specific product. For this reason, a 
partial equilibrium model has proven most relevant and useful. Next chapter will provide a 
summary of research focusing on the kiwifruit industry and similar trade-related issues. It 
concludes by determining how this particular research contributes to current literature. 
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5. Literature review 
 
Since trade related issues in the kiwifruit industry have been rarely modelled so far, studies 
carried out in related industries will be reviewed together with the trade modelling literature in 
order to establish a relevant framework for future examination and analysis in this study. 
Parallels from trade in kiwifruit can be drawn to other valuable sources of horticultural export 
revenue for New Zealand and other countries, since other horticultural industries are concerned 
with similar trends and strategic challenges both currently and ahead.  
 
A few criteria for article selection were established before selecting relevant literature. First of 
all, articles focusing on the kiwifruit industry were of primary interest to this research. Only 
when this literature had been identified, the potential gap where this research may provide value 
could be established. It was therefore investigated what had been done so far in the area in terms 
of modelling (preferably trade modelling) or investigation of trade-related issues. 
 
Secondly, the trade modelling literature was reviewed and evaluated. The search for 
relevantarticles was kept as close to the kiwifruit sector as possible. The essence of this thesis 
constitutes the different hypotheses and therefore literature of PE modelling of similar issues on 
similar products was examined. Trade-related issues such as non-tariff trade barriers, trade 
liberalisation and the impact of a supply increase on other horticultural or agricultural markets, 
and/or how they are modelled, were taken into account in this chapter. 
 
Protective trade restrictions such as SPS measures are increasingly affecting the current trade in 
kiwifruit (Voss, 2005). A global expansion of kiwifruit production constitutes another issue that 
is likely to have a significant impact on future trade patterns. This section will further explain the 
effects of these trade related issues based on previous studies carried out in the kiwifruit industry 
and studies using relevant trade modelling methodology in related industries.  
 
 
5.1. Kiwifruit literature 
 
Saunders and Cagatay (2003) investigate the short to medium term impact of commercially 
releasing Genetically Modified (GM) food and food production in New Zealand. The impact of 
different levels of GM food on producers, consumers and trade in New Zealand is simulated 
through scenarios using the GEMO, a trade model developed based on the Lincoln Trade and 
Environment Model (LTEM) framework. The results of the analysis illustrate the impact of GM 
introduction on New Zealand producer returns. A 20 percent change in preferences for GM food, 
for example, simulates an increase in producer returns by 20 percent for kiwifruit.  
 
Peterson and Willett (2000) analysed the U.S. kiwifruit industry and its determinants of supply, 
demand and the price received by growers, through the use of a dynamic industry model. The 
study provides a quantitative description of the U.S. kiwifruit industry and a framework for 
decision making in production and marketing of fresh horticultural products. The study was the 
first economic analysis of the U.S. kiwifruit industry and is divided into a production sector 
component and a demand sector.  
 
The model framework in Peterson and Willett (2000) is based on an annual component 
representing the production process and a monthly component expressing the marketing process. 
Profitability between sectors is compared and the model simulates relevant information for 
growers of whether to stay in production of kiwifruit, alter to another crop (peach) or convert to 
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non-farm uses. The study shows that early plantings of kiwifruit are quite speculative and as the 
orchard matures expected profitability and potential performance are increasingly significant 
parameters in the decision-making of future production and aim for increased returns (Peterson 
and Willett, 2000) .  
 
The above model is not a model of trade. However, it mentions imports as one of the main 
factors affecting the production of US kiwifruit, which emphasises the significance of 
international trade on domestic markets.  
 
An article by Fournier and Hassan (2003) investigates the pricing factors throughout the 
French kiwifruit channel and stresses that the type of margin (constant or proportional) at one 
stage strongly influences demand price elasticity and hence upstream turnover. Demand price 
elasticity is calculated for each of the three stages of the supply chain (production, shipping and 
retail). The demand function Q=Cpε is calculated, where ε is the demand price elasticity at the 
level considered. The results of the estimations illustrate the highest elasticity on retail level 
(1.71), a positive elasticity at shipping level (1.26) and a steady elasticity at production level 
(0.81).  
 
Again, the research in Fournier and Hassan (2003) is focused on production and does not include 
other countries or varieties.  
 
 
5.2. Trade modelling literature 
 
A study by Bakshi (2003) examines the impacts on demand, supply, imports and prices when 
Mexican avocados are allowed into the U.S. through the alleviation of U.S. SPS barriers. 
Results, through the use of a partial equilibrium trade model, show that Mexican imports 
increase significantly (as expected) when the U.S. market opens up. Imports from New Zealand 
and Chile as well as domestic U.S. supply fall when Mexican avocados enter the market. 
Consumption and total supply increase. The price of Mexican avocados increases whereas the 
prices of Californian, Chilean and New Zealand avocados decrease. As a result when the price 
on Mexican avocados increases, U.S. consumption subsequently falls. From the areas where 
Mexican access is granted, avocados from the U.S., New Zealand and Chile are generally 
redistributed. The supply of avocados with domestic or non-Mexican origin rises in the areas 
where Mexican avocados have no access, since the price of avocados falls across the entire 
country and the total supply, foreign and domestic, is displaced from approved Mexican access 
regions to other parts of the country. The result of this study demonstrates an increase of total 
supplies of avocado in the U.S. by 12 percent when Mexican avocados are imported. This 
consequently causes the price of domestic avocados to fall by 12.5 percent.  
 
A report by Calvin and Krissoff (2005) explains the trade relationship between the world’s 
largest apple exporters and the Japanese market. New Zealand used to export apples to Japan 
during five years (1993-1998) under a phytosanitary protocol, but found that the costs exceeded 
the benefits with the protocol. The report recognises a phytosanitary technical barrier as a 
measure that alters the relative price between the domestic market and the rest of the world and 
hence creates a price wedge between potential traders. The analysis concludes that exporters will 
enjoy increased opportunities due to the adjustment of the Japanese phytosanitary protocol, with 
domestic production decreasing by approximately 11 percent. Japanese consumers, on the other 
hand, would gain from lower prices and greater availability of varieties (Calvin and Krissoff 
2005). 
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Research by Arthur (2006) examines the Australian SPS measure which restricts apple imports 
from New Zealand, and consider the economic impact that liberalisation would have on 
Australian welfare. The import ban was introduced in the 1920s in order to prevent the disease 
fireblight to enter the Australian production system via imports from New Zealand. The import 
barrier restricts market supply and competition and thereby raises the domestic price of the 
commodity, affecting consumers negatively yet benefiting domestic producers. The potential 
liberalisation of the Australian-New Zealand apple market was assessed through a Markov Chain 
Analysis. The paper’s conclusion was that if the Australian apple market is liberalised through a 
relaxation of its SPS measures, regardless of the severity and the impact of a disease entry, social 
welfare increases relative to the current situation.  
 
Research carried out by the Economic Research Service of the USDA (n.d.) investigates three 
different ways of analysing the effect of a technical barrier to trade through trade modelling. One 
of them constitutes a demand-shift element, which should be used if a trade regulation has been 
introduced to improve information to the consumer. Such information can be related to factors 
such as country of origin and quality and allows for the regulation to have a beneficial impact on 
producers or consumers. The demand-shift model implies a shift of the demand curve from an 
initial assumption of limited information to a situation where information targeted at consumers 
increases. Consumers, being better informed, are better off and demand for imported products 
either increases or decreases (shifts the demand curve outwards or inwards). 
 
A research report on liberalisation in global dairy trade carried out by Saunders, Cagatay and 
Moxey (2004), utilises a partial equilibrium modelling approach to investigate three different 
scenarios in dairy trade, an industry where New Zealand is a significant global actor. The 
scenarios include: no liberalisation, EU liberalisation and OECD liberalisation. The simulated 
results through the Lincoln Trade and Environment Model (LTEM) suggest that EU 
liberalisation leads to a rise in producer prices of raw milk in the main countries, except for the 
EU itself, suffering a price drop of 20 percent. EU production falls as well. The same scenario 
causes raw milk prices to rise by 11 percent in New Zealand and Australia. Under OECD 
liberalisation, production drops by three percent in the EU, eight percent in Japan and 2.5 percent 
in the United States. Australian and New Zealand outputs, however, rise by four and three 
percent, due to their comparative advantage in dairy production. This research suggests that New 
Zealand and Australia appear to gain most from full OECD liberalisation in global dairy trade. 
 
According to current literature the introduction of an SPS measure results in domestic producers 
benefiting from the introduction of the restriction and exporters are worse off when facing the 
trade restriction. If supply increases on the domestic market consumers are subsequently better 
off due to lower prices and greater availability. It is also concluded that complete trade 
liberalisation would benefit New Zealand producers. 
 
There are very few quantitative models in the international literature that consider kiwifruit, let 
alone different varieties of kiwifruit, and those that do exist do not adequately incorporate trade 
aspects. There has been no specific analytical framework available to examine changes in the 
dynamics of the kiwifruit industry in New Zealand.  
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5.3. Conclusion of chapter 
 
This section examined some of the present literature relevant to this research and how similar 
studies have been carried out in the past. It explains how they contribute to this study and also 
provides an understanding of the gaps in the literature where this research will be of significant 
value. 
 
In order to investigate and answer the research questions of this thesis, a modified and industry-
specific version of a partial equilibrium framework will be developed and used. The approach 
taken is novel in two ways. Firstly, a model specific to the kiwifruit sector is developed to 
simulate various trade conditions. Secondly, the study considers key aspects of the kiwifruit 
industry and links these to international trade in the sector. 
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6. Methodology 
 
Having outlined in chapter five why PE modelling is the best option, it is in this chapter possible 
to present the specifics of the model chosen, developed and calibrated for this research. 
 
The empirical model, KIWI, is based on the framework for the Lincoln Trade and Environment 
Model (LTEM) (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). The KIWI model is a multi-country, three-
commodity partial equilibrium model focusing on the kiwifruit industry ignoring linkages with 
the rest of the economy. The framework is used to analyse the impacts of various domestic and 
border policies on the country and commodity-based price, demand, supply and net trade levels. 
KIWI is a price equilibrium, non-spatial model, which implies that focus is put on net trade of 
commodities between countries rather than trade flows based on country size, borders and 
geographical proximity. It is only observable what actors (countries) bring to the market and 
what each actor takes form the market. The non-spatial approach is therefore also referred to as 
the pooled market approach. The opposite approach is the one of bilateral specification, where 
representation of the complete set of interactions between each buyer and seller and for each 
commodity is defined (van Tongeren, van Meijl and Surry, 2000). The model framework also 
assumes that the structure of markets is competitive (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
KIWI is a synthetic model with parameters adopted from the literature. There are mainly two 
methods for estimating parameters in an applied trade model. The economic estimation 
approach, where parameters are derived through simultaneous equation estimation provides the 
most accurate result. However, this method is in some cases unfeasible, due to size of the model, 
identification problems and data unavailability. Instead, the calibration method, or the synthetic 
approach, is more widely used. For this purpose, data for the model is collected from existing 
literature and adjusted for the relevant model.  (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
The model is used to quantify price, supply, demand and net trade effects of various policy 
changes. The model is calibrated to year 2003 and simulations are carried out up to 2013. This 
implies that policy impacts are derived in a comparative static fashion, based on the year 2003 
(Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). A dynamic approach, on the other hand, would provide results 
based on the process over time (Francois and Hall, 1997).  
 
The commodities included in KIWI are green kiwifruit, gold kiwifruit, and organic green 
kiwifruit. Commodities in the model are treated as homogenous with respect to country of origin 
and destination and to the physical characteristics of each product. Therefore, commodities are 
considered as substitutes in consumption on international markets9 (Saunders and Cagatay, 
2003). 
 
The coverage of the KIWI model includes the major kiwifruit producers and consumers, 
specified by 13 countries: Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), China (CI), Chile (CL), France (FR), 
Germany (GM), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), New Zealand (NZ), Spain (SP), United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). It further considers three additional trading regions: 
the old European Union (EO), including the first 15 member states, the new European Union 
(EN), including the subsequent member states acceded through 2004, and rest of the world 
(RW). Some of the actual EO members are accounted for separately in the model (significant 
                                                          
9 As previously mentioned, New Zealand can command a premium in global markets due to various long standing 
industry factors, which would suggest that all kiwifruit are not the same. However, for simplicity and modelling 
purposes all green kiwifruit will be considered as homogenous and further differentiation between IPM kiwifruit and 
other kiwifruit will instead be suggested for future research. 
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independent producers or consumers) and therefore not included in the EO variable as to avoid 
accounting for the same value twice. Therefore, the countries included in the EO are Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. The EN 
variable includes Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. The rest of the world (RW) conclusively encompasses all countries not 
elsewhere included in the model.  
 
Table 4: General characteristics of the KIWI model 
Model KIWI 
Modelling approach Partial equilibrium 
Solution type Non-spatial, net trade 
Parameters Synthetic 
Commodity coverage 3 
Country coverage 16 
Behavioural equations  Domestic supply 
(per commodity and country) Domestic demand 
 Stocks 
 Producer price 
 Consumer price 
 Trade price 
Economic identity Net trade 
Source: Saunders and Cagatay, 2003 
 
The framework of the KIWI model allows the application of various domestic and border 
policies explicitly such as production quotas, set-aside policies, input and/or output related 
producer subsidies/taxes, consumer subsides/taxes, minimum prices, import tariffs and quotas, 
export subsidies and taxes (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). However, only some of the policies are 
currently of interest in kiwifruit trade.  
 
 
6.1. Equations 
 
The general equation structure of each commodity at country level (see appendix A4 for country 
specific equations) in KIWI is represented by six behavioural equations and one economic 
identity as defined in the equations 1 to 7 (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
),( jiij exWDptfpt    (1) 
),( jijij smptgpp    (2) 
),( jijij cmpthpc    (3) 
),( ikjijij ppfplqp    (4) 
),( ijijij pcfcmqc    (5) 
),( , ijijij qpfenqe    (6) 
ijijijij qeqcqpqt    (7) 
 
The trade price (pt) of a commodity (i) in a country (j) is determined as a function of world 
market price (WDpti) of that commodity and the exchange rate (exj). The domestic producer and 
consumer prices are determined by the trade prices of the related commodity and the country’s 
domestic and border policies. The trade price therefore constitutes the producer price excluding 
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trade restrictions. The total effect of a change in world market price on the trade price of the 
country is determined by the price transmission elasticity.  
 
The domestic producer (ppij) and consumer prices (pcij) are defined as functions of the 
commodity’s trade price and specific production and consumption related domestic 
support/subsidy policies, (smij) and (cmij). The domestic production and consumption equations 
are specified as constant elasticity functions that incorporate both the own and cross-price 
effects. Domestic production (qpij) is specified as a function of producer price (ppij) and a 
productivity (fpij) shifter, which represents the economic factors and policies that result in 
production shifts. Domestic consumption (qcij) is specified as a function of consumer price (pcij) 
and a consumption function (fcij) shifter, representing the economic factors and policies that 
result in consumption shifts. The ending stocks (qeij) are determined as a function of the stock 
shifter (feij) and quantity produced (qpij). The shift variables in these equations allow exogenous 
shocks to produce pivotal shifts of the related functions. The equations also include cross-price 
effects from the kiwifruits in the model.  Finally, net trade (qtij) of the country (j) in commodity 
(i) is determined as the difference between domestic production and the sum of domestic 
consumption and stock changes in the related year (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
 
6.2. Supply 
  
In the KIWI framework, a uniform aggregate domestic supply function is used for each variety 
and country, specified as a function of own- and cross prices. Interdependencies between 
substitutes are reflected by cross-price elasticities (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
 
6.3. Demand 
 
The behavioural relationship is assumed to be derived from the consumers maximising utility, 
acting under perfect competition. Therefore, demand is specified as a function of own- and 
substitute prices, per capita income and population growth rate (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). 
 
 
6.4. Economic identity 
 
The economic identity is the net trade equation, which equals trade through excess supply or 
excess demand in the domestic economy, identifying the country as either a net-exporter or a 
net-importer (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). Countries therefore make up the difference between 
domestic supply and domestic demand through trade. 
 
Markets are linked to each other through net trade. A basic assumption of the model states that 
world imports have to equal world exports in all regions involved so that net trade equals zero in 
equilibrium. If a market is distorted from equilibrium (net trade ≠ 0), a new equilibrium is 
calculated so that all markets are cleared. The new world equilibrium subsequently affects all 
relevant and connected market structures, through the adjustment of domestic price structures 
(Francois and Hall, 1997). 
 
Trade policies affect the international market and hence adjust the price linkage between 
domestic and trade prices. Domestic policies, on the other hand, primarily affect supply and 
demand structures, which in turn have a consequent effect across regions and on international 
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trade (Francois and Hall, 1997). The market clearing equations close world markets for the 
relevant commodities and provide a mechanism to find a new world equilibrium if any (or all) 
markets are out of balance. Each world trade equation (for each commodity or region) 
defines/calculates net world trade as a sum of net trade from all regions (Francois and Hall, 
1997). 
 
The model basically operates by simulating the commodity based world market clearing price on 
the domestic quantities, prices and trade in each country. The different equations in the model 
are parameterised to reproduce the 2003 base data for each country’s supply, demand, prices and 
trade (Saunders and Cagatay, 2003). The method for establishing world equilibrium and 
calculating market prices after a shock follows a certain structure. First of all, the model 
recalculates the domestic equations for supply, demand and trade, after the market has been 
exposed to an exogenous change/modification. The model consequently recalculates world net 
trade, which in turn leads to the estimation of a new world price and the establishment of a new 
world equilibrium. The impact of the new equilibrium on domestic prices in relevant markets is 
then determined, which in turn has an effect on domestic supply and demand schedules. When 
all these changes have been calculated world trade markets have found their new equilibria and a 
new solution in the model has been established (Francois and Hall, 1997). KIWI can capture the 
disequilibrium situations in the economy that may result from temporary shortages or excess 
supply situations by allowing the determination of stock levels endogenously. The pattern of 
prices and quantities observed in the base year is then compared to the pattern that emerges when 
the model is being exposed to changes. 
 
 
6.5. Data required 
 
The LTEM framework facilitates the selection and implementation of a preferred model 
structure. The framework hence makes it possible to construct a specific model in terms of 
product and country coverage and through the specification and adaptation of equations and 
policies. 
 
In order to construct the KIWI model, the following data was required to develop a suitable 
framework for industry-specific scenarios: 
 
Prices: producer, consumer and trade prices for selected countries and varieties. 
 
Quantities: production, consumption, exports and imports for selected countries and 
varieties. 
 
Elasticities: Demand, supply, cross-price and income elasticities were required. 
 
Policies: Trade restricting policies such as import tariffs were collected for each 
country. Non-tariff trade barriers are not included per se, but can be modelled 
through shifts in either supply or demand (shift-parameters). 
 
Macroeconomic  data in terms of GDP, population and their growth rates. 
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6.5.1. Data sources 
 
Much of the data for green kiwifruit has been sourced from the statistical database of the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations. The year 2003 was set as the base 
year for the model, since the LTEM was already calibrated to this year. Data available beyond 
2003 were also included. In order to maintain consistency data would ideally have been sourced 
from one single source. This was however unfeasible, since no one single database provides all 
required data for all varieties and countries involved. Therefore, a series of databases were used 
for different purposes and the most commonly utilised include: the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, World Kiwifruit Reviews (Belrose, 2004-2007), 
ZESPRI, European Commission Agricultural database, United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the New Zealand Ministries of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MFAT). 
 
Data on kiwifruit trade have been relatively difficult to obtain and some primary data could not 
be obtained. Data on gold and green organic kiwifruit were particularly difficult to obtain. The 
FAO data on green kiwifruit therefore provided a basis for several assumptions about the other 
two varieties. In all cases, the most current data have been projected up until 2013. 
 
It should be mentioned that the FAO database does not distinguish between green, gold or green 
organic in its data on prices, production, consumption and trade. It has therefore been assumed 
that the data reflect total world quantity of all kiwifruit varieties. Given the proportion of green 
kiwifruit on the world market, the price data has been treated as representative of the green 
kiwifruit sector only. 
 
 
6.5.2. Prices 
 
The domestic producer (ppij) and consumer prices (pcij) are, as earlier mentioned, defined as 
functions of the commodity’s trade price and specific production and consumption related 
domestic support/subsidy policies, (smij) and (cmij). No producer subsidies
10 or consumer 
support were estimated or considered in this research. The FAO statistics for producer price was 
uniformly used for all countries. 
 
 
                                                          
10 Due to unavailability of data this parameter was not considered in this research, even if producer subsidies may be 
implemented by some kiwifruit producing countries. 
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Green Kiwifruit 
 
Kiwifruit producer prices were sourced from FAOSTAT. Where available, producer price 
(US$/tonne) was used.  The availability of data, however, necessitated the substitution of 
average import unit value (US$/tonne) for the importing countries Belgium, France, Germany, 
Japan, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
For New Zealand, total fruit and service payment including premium ($ per tray equivalent) was 
used as a proxy for producer/consumer price data (Zespri International Limited, 2005) and 
converted into US$/tonne, using an exchange rate of 0.70 US$/NZ$. 
 
Among major kiwifruit producers, China is the only country in the FAO database that does not 
have a representative producer price.  This exclusion creates a unique problem for China.  
Among non-producing countries, average import unit values are sufficient because they do not 
affect domestic production. Because China is a major producer, using import prices has the 
potential to overstate returns to domestic producers. Therefore, a base year 2003 average ratio of 
producer price/import price was calculated for three major kiwifruit producing countries that 
record both statistics – New Zealand, Italy and the United States. The average producer price in 
these three countries was 74 percent of the import price. The 74 percent value was then 
multiplied by the FAO 2003 average import unit value (US$/tonne) to find the producer price for 
China.       
 
 
Gold Kiwifruit 
 
Gold kiwifruit is mainly produced in New Zealand and China (Huang and Ferguson, 2003; 
Zespri International Limited, 2005).  Pricing data for China was unobtainable.  Prices for New 
Zealand were available in the ZESPRI Annual Report (2005) and converted to US$/tonne using 
the exchange rate of 0.70 US$/NZ$. To establish gold producer and consumer prices for each 
country, ZESPRI gold orchard gate returns were averaged over growing seasons 2002 to 2006, 
resulting in a gold premium of 29 percent over green kiwifruit. This premium was subsequently 
multiplied by the FAO green producer and consumer prices for each country (Zespri 
International Limited, 2005; FAO, 2007).  
 
 
Green organic 
 
Green organic price data is very difficult to obtain. Numbers are usually restricted to prices 
quoted within one place and time and are not representative of yearly average producer price. 
Additionally, price premiums for organic kiwifruit vary considerably from country to country.   
 
ZESPRI is the single largest world marketer of kiwifruit (ZESPRI, nd). Since approximately four 
percent of the total kiwifruit marketed by ZESPRI is organic (Dryden et al. 2002), ZESPRI 
orchard gate returns are again observed as a reliable proxy for determining a consistent 
worldwide market premium for organic kiwifruit (Zespri International Limited, 2005). The 
resulting price average of four growing seasons (2002-2006) yields a premium of 41 percent for 
green organic over green kiwifruit which sits well within the range of organic premiums 
recorded in the literature (The Foreign Agricultural Service, 1999; Boto, Liu, Kortbech-Olesen, 
Vrolijk and Pilauskas 2001; Dimitri, Oberholtzer and Greene, 2005). The premium is multiplied 
by the green producer and consumer prices to yield the organic green producer and consumer 
prices for each country.          
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Table 5: ZESPRI premiums for gold and organic 
 Season Gold/Green Organic/Green 
2002-2003 17% 34% 
2003-2004 14% 37% 
2004-2005 27% 40% 
2005-2006 58% 54% 
Average 2002-2006 29% 41% 
Source: ZESPRI Annual Report 2005-2006  
 
 
Trade price 
 
FAO data for producer price includes the value of country-specific tariffs. In order to obtain the 
trade price, the value of each country’s tariff was removed (New Zealand Fruitgrowers 
Federation, 2003; Skilton, 2005). Table 3 provides a sample calculation of trade price for 
Belgium where:  producer price * (100% - tariff rate) = trade price. 
 
 
Table 6: Belgium producer/consumer/trade price 
Commodity 
Producer/Consumer 
price 
Tariff 
rate 
Trade price 
Green  $1,400.86 8% $1,288.79 
Gold  $1,807.11 8% $1,662.54 
Organic  $1,975.21 8% $1,817.19 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
6.5.3. Quantities 
 
Green kiwifruit 
 
FAOSTAT provides worldwide trade data for kiwifruit including production, consumption and 
import and export statistics. As previously mentioned, net traded quantities for each country is 
defined by the difference between domestic production and consumption. Net trade is also 
defined as the difference between exports and imports. 
 
FAO consumption data do not consider fruit loss/waste or processed kiwifruit  (Belrose Inc., 
2006). For modelling purposes, FAO production, import and export data are therefore used to 
derive consumption figures as to balance the net trade equation. Where quantities were given in 
the unit trays, the value was converted into the generic unit of metric tonnes based on the 
assumption that one tray weighs 3.6 kg (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2004), (Zespri, 
2004-2005), (Oppenheimer Group, 2003). 
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Gold kiwifruit 
 
New Zealand and China are considered to be the sole world producers of gold kiwifruit in 2003 
(Huang and Ferguson, 2001). Production data for New Zealand are provided in ZESPRI’s 
Annual Report. China’s production has been based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 
2002, providing detailed acreages and a list of varieties, three of which have been identified as 
golden - Jinkui, Jinfeng and Lushanxiang (Huang and Ferguson, 2003).  This review also 
provides data on overall average yield per hectare which, when multiplied by total gold hectares 
planted, resulted in the estimate used for Chinese gold production.                
 
Both New Zealand and China are developing overseas relationships in order to be able to supply 
gold kiwifruit all year round (12 month supply programmes). New Zealand has licensed nearly 
840 hectares of Hort16A in several countries around the world, beginning in the early part of this 
decade (Zespri International Limited, 2005). ZESPRI reports some data on country-specific 
acreages planted, but production and yield data are not available. Actual yields are believed to be 
small in base year 2003 and have been projected forward through 2013 at zero due to lack of 
reliable data. In 2000, China licensed the worldwide propagation rights to a gold variety known 
as Jin Tao to an Italian company, the Kiwigold Consortium (Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
2003). Evidence suggests that significant quantities of Jin Tao were produced in Italy by 2005 
and that production has also been licensed to France, Uruguay and Chile (China News, 2005; 
Belrose Inc., 2006; Kiwigold Consortium, 2007).        
          
ZESPRI’s production and export distribution is published in annual reports, although it does not 
break out country-specific statistics (with the exception of Japan). To calculate country-specific 
consumption for European countries, total EU gold exports were allocated to importing countries 
in direct proportion to their consumption of green kiwifruit according to the following example 
(where BE = Belgium): 
 
BE green consumption / total EU green consumption = BE % of EU 
green consumption 
 
Total EU gold consumption (ZESPRI EU exports) x BE % of EU 
green consumption = BE gold consumption 
 
The following table illustrates consumption (production less net trade) of kiwifruit in different 
EU countries. The first column shows total consumption of green kiwifruit and the second 
column shows the different countries’ share of total EU consumption of green kiwifruit. Finally, 
the third column illustrates quantities of Gold consumption for each EU country in the model, 
derived from each country’s consumption of green kiwifruit (as explained above). 
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Table 7: EU green/gold kiwifruit consumption in metric tonnes 
   2002     2003    2004   
Country Green % EU   Gold  Green % EU   Gold  Green  % EU   Gold  
BE 92.04 12.8% 1.20 97.73 14.7% 1.4 110.42 13.4% 2.13 
EO 53.67 7.5% 0.70 61.19 9.2% 0.9 62.67 7.6% 1.21 
EN 42.03 5.8% 0.55 47.48 7.2% 0.7 77.38 9.4% 1.49 
FR 82.04 11.4% 1.07 83.64 12.6% 1.2 93.44 11.4% 1.80 
GE 102.41 14.2% 1.33 84.74 12.8% 1.2 87.33 10.6% 1.68 
GR 44.00 6.1% 0.57 44.63 6.7% 0.6 34.71 4.2% 0.67 
IT 181.37 25.2% 2.36 115.01 17.3% 1.6 222.64 27.1% 4.29 
SP 91.96 12.8% 1.20 97.82 14.7% 1.4 100.9 12.3% 1.94 
UK  29.69 4.1% 0.39 31.94 4.8% 0.5 33.32 4.1% 0.64 
Total 719.21 100.0% 9.36 664.18 100.0% 9.4 822.81 100.0% 15.84 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
Green organic 
 
Country-specific data on organic kiwifruit is very limited. A literature review of the general 
organic agricultural markets in individual countries proved useful in guiding production and 
consumption data assumptions for these markets. Countries that are significant producers of 
kiwifruit tend to also be significant producers of organic kiwifruit (Boto, Liu, Kortbech-Olesen, 
Vrolijk and Pilauskas. 2001; Zespri International Limited, 2005). Organic kiwifruit production 
figures in the model are based on two basic assumptions. First of all, conventional and organic 
green kiwifruit realise the same yield.  Conflicting data suggest the occurrence of both higher 
yields and lower repack losses for organic kiwifruit (Hugh, Hasey, Johnson, Meyer and Klonsky, 
n.d.), while other sources suggest organic kiwifruit yields are less than conventional kiwifruit 
(Hugh, Hasey, Johnson, Meyer and Klonsky, n.d.). Secondly, organic kiwifruit production is five 
percent of conventional green kiwifruit production. This assumption likely overstates production 
for some countries in the model but is supported in the literature for the major world producers 
of kiwifruit (Boto, Liu, Kortbech-Olesen, Vrolijk and Pilauskas. 2001; Klonsky and Carmen, 
2004; Zespri International Limited, 2005; California Kiwifruit Commission, n.d.). Table 5 
demonstrates the level of organic production for two major kiwifruit producers.   
 
Table 8: Production ratio: green organic to conventional (total yield) 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Average 
United States 4.3% 5.8% 4.6% 5.4%       5.1% 
New Zealand         4.9% 4.6% 4.6% 4.7% 
Source: California Kiwifruit Commission & ZESPRI Annual Report 2005-2006 
 
Organic consumption has been observed to be growing at double-digit rates annually for much of 
the developed world (Boto, Liu, Kortbech-Olesen, Vrolijk and Pilauskas, 2001; Organic Trade 
Association, 2007) and organic kiwifruit consumption as a percentage of green kiwifruit 
consumption averages between one and five percent of green kiwifruit consumption (Boto, Liu, 
Kortbech-Olesen, Vrolijk and Pilauskas, 2001; Zespri International Limited, 2005; van der Wiel, 
2006). Where available, consumption statistics of fresh organic fruits and vegetables are 
observed to be even higher (van der Wiel, 2006). It was therefore assumed that organic kiwifruit 
consumption is five percent of conventional green kiwifruit consumption.  
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New Zealand quantities were mainly sourced from ZESPRI, both annual reports and other 
documents. For other countries, data on production, consumption and trade were mostly 
extracted from the FAO Statistic Database. USDA database also provided some country-specific 
information on quantities.  
 
 
6.4.4. Elasticities 
 
The elasticity parameters are key variables in the model since they determine the responsiveness 
of domestic supply and demand to changing prices and policy measures. The framework 
assumes that price sensitivity varies by country and across the three varieties. Assumptions and 
calculations of elasticities (own-price, supply, income and cross-price) had to be made (see 
appendix A7). Each country in the model has an individual demand and supply (possibly zero) 
for each kiwifruit variety.  
 
Elasticities for the KIWI model are synthesised from the literature. Demand elasticities were 
mainly sourced from the World Kiwifruit Review (2004) and the articles by Fournier and Hassan 
(2003) and Hanawa Peterson and Willett (2000). In the case of insufficient data on elasticities for 
specific countries, basic assumptions such as classifying a country as producing or non-
producing or as developed or developing were made and elasticities of similar countries were 
applied. When two elasticities were found for the same country (kiwifruit specific), they were 
averaged. Demand elasticity for organic fruit is assumed to be twice the value of conventional 
fruit, according to a study of the U.K. organic market by ADAS (2003). Since gold and green 
organic kiwifruit are both charged with significantly higher premiums than green, the demand 
elasticities for both varieties were, for simplicity, considered to be twice the value of the country-
specific conventional demand elasticity. The elasticities in the original LTEM for producing 
countries appear to lie between 0.3 and 0.5. The assumption was therefore made to set supply 
elasticity for these countries to 0.4 in the KIWI model. For non-producing countries supply 
elasticity was assumed to be 0.1 (for modelling purposes). It was further assumed that supply 
elasticities would equal across varieties. The value of income elasticity in the original LTEM is 
represented by the value of 0.18 in all countries. Based on income elasticities allocated in the 
World Kiwifruit Review of 2004 (Belrose Inc, 2004) and the LTEM number, new elasticities 
were calculated by setting the lowest number equal to 0.18 and allowing the following numbers 
to increase proportionally. Income elasticities were further assumed to equal across varieties. 
The value for cross-price elasticity was assumed to be 0.5 across all varieties, directly extracted 
from the original LTEM, assuming that the different kiwifruit varieties are substitutes. 
 
Where data on elasticities for specific countries were unobtainable, basic assumptions such as 
classifying a country as producing or non-producing or as developed or developing were made 
and elasticities of most similar countries were applied. Greece is an example of such a country 
where the closest applicable economy was assumed to be the EU region. Belgium, a non-
producing yet large kiwifruit consuming country was assumed to be most similar to Germany, 
another European non-producing country with a similarly developed economy. Chile was 
assumed to be most comparable to China, due to its significant kiwifruit producing and 
developing economy characteristics. The model incorporates the “rest of world” as a separate 
country variable, which was assumed to be mostly related to China, since it includes India, 
another significant developing country. 
 
Sensitivity analyses were carried out to test the robustness of the estimated elasticities. Results 
illustrate that alterations in prices change the quantity demanded as expected and according to 
theory. The estimated elasticities therefore appear legitimate. 
 50 
 
6.4.5. Policies 
 
Import tariffs for relevant countries were obtained from different sources, ranging from a high of 
20 percent imposed by China, to eight percent introduced by the EU. The policies are 
represented by the parameters sm (producer market subsidies, fees, levies, direct payments, etc.) 
and cm (consumer market subsidies). See appendix and table A5 for details on import tariffs. 
Subsidies are not included in the model due to insufficient information. When there are no 
policies affecting domestic prices for a certain commodity, then the variables sm and cm take the 
value 0. Alternatively, if a complete free market policy is introduced, then sm and cm equal 1. 
 
 
6.4.6. Macroeconomic data 
 
Macroeconomic data for each country on population, Gross Domestic Product and productivity 
levels and their respective growth rates were sourced from the OECD statistical database. 
 
 
6.5. Conclusion of chapter 
 
This chapter gave a brief description of the theoretical considerations underlying the new KIWI 
model. The new kiwifruit model was constructed so as to include the different industry-specific 
countries and varieties, allowing for consumers to be able to substitute between the different 
varieties of kiwifruit for each other. The section further identified data requirements and sources 
of the data obtained to facilitate the construction and further analysis of the KIWI model. 
Additional necessary assumptions and estimations, where lack of data was an issue, were also 
presented. Following is a description of the scenarios developed for this research. The purpose of 
these scenarios is to provide an understanding of potential trade-related issues facing the New 
Zealand kiwifruit industry, and their impacts. 
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7. Description of the scenarios 
 
The LTEM was adapted to develop a three-commodity world kiwifruit trade model. The model 
will be used to investigate potential impacts of trade-related issues on production, consumption 
and trade for various scenarios. The potential changes, outlined in chapter two, are reproduced 
through the development of relevant scenarios. The final impact on producer returns will reflect 
the results of the different scenarios. 
 
Scenarios have been selected and simulated according to potential future scenarios facing the 
global trade in general and the domestic New Zealand industry in particular. These scenarios 
constitute the most central and probable situations potentially influencing New Zealand trade in 
kiwifruit. This section initially describes the scenarios, their relevance and expected results. The 
results of the different scenarios are then evaluated and compared to the results of the reference 
scenario. The KIWI model was hence initially run with existing conditions for the base year 
2003 with iterations to the year 2013. Three scenarios were developed; an EU introduction of an 
SPS policy, an expansion of Chinese production and finally a full trade liberalisation scenario. 
The objective of this research is to quantify and analyse the possible effects that these changes 
might have on the kiwifruit industry especially in New Zealand. The effects of the different 
scenarios will therefore be measured in changes in New Zealand producer returns11. 
 
 
7.1. Reference Scenario 
 
The reference scenario, to which all other scenarios are compared, is set according to actual 
conditions in 2003. The reference scenario represents the situation with factual production, 
consumption and traded quantities at trading conditions (tariffs and prices) in 2003 (see 
Appendix A5). The results of the scenarios are presented for the year 2013 and compared to the 
reference scenario’s results in 2013 (see Appendix A6). 
 
 
7.2. EU consumption drop, reducing New Zealand imports through 
an SPS policy.  
 
The European Union, if taken as a whole, is the largest consumer of kiwifruit in the world.  
According to FAO consumption data for 2004, the European Union alone accounts for 64 
percent of world kiwifruit consumption (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations, 2006; FAOSTAT, 2006).  
                                                          
11 Given the specific focus on the New Zealand kiwifruit industry, no macroeconomic results (changes in national 
welfare, GDP growth, etc) are reported. 
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This scenario will illustrate a large drop in EU consumption, as a result of a stricter SPS policy. 
The scenario targets New Zealand imports and is modelled through a shift in EU consumption12, 
assuming that all EU countries are affected by the import restriction, but still accepting trade 
within the EU and with other countries. Since New Zealand’s share of EU imports constitute 
approximately 60 percent of green kiwifruit and this is the number by which the consumption 
shift parameter (fcKW=0.4) will be reduced in this scenario.  
 
The expected result of this scenario, according to theory, would suggest that the import 
restriction to the European market, due to an introduction of an SPS measure, reduces the 
imported quantity. Producers in the importing country are better off, since the SPS policy 
restricts imports and thereby protects domestic producers from international competition. 
Consumers in the importing country are worse off, due to fewer products at a higher price. 
Producers in the exporting country suffer from reduced exports and hence lower returns. New 
Zealand producers are hence negatively affected by a potential EU introduction of an SPS 
policy13.  
 
 
7.3. Chinese production doubles by 2013. 
 
Huang & Ferguson (2003) estimate that one fifth to one third of production is processed 
domestically. As previously discussed, this could be due to the lack of infrastructure necessary to 
support the grading, storage and distribution of fresh fruit, but also because of the relatively low 
quality of the country’s fruit. Commercial orchards continue to grow, making wild harvests less 
important and recent growth in kiwifruit exports may indicate that infrastructure is being 
improved (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2007). Since the country 
previously managed to solve the quality problems facing the apple and pear industries, it is likely 
to perform similarly in the kiwifruit industry (Belrose Inc, 2006). In 1999, the total production of 
kiwifruit from China reached 165,000 metric tonnes. In 2003, production totalled 300,000 metric 
tonnes (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2007) and was estimated to 
have reached 400,000 metric tonnes per year by 2006. If productivity approaches the level of 
other countries, Chinese annual production could potentially reach 700 000 metric tonnes per 
year (Huang and Ferguson, 2001). China is currently the largest volume producer of kiwifruit, 
yet productivity was still very low at around 8.5 metric tonnes/hectare according to the last 
comprehensive survey conducted in 2003 (Huang and Ferguson, 2003). No productivity 
improvements will be incorporated in the scenario modelled, which probably understates the 
output expansion that might be possible.  
 
If China, being considered as a major producing and exporting country, contributes to an 
increased supply of kiwifruit on the world market, theory suggests that world prices of kiwifruit 
will be reduced due to a significant increase in global supply. This scenario is modelled through 
increasing Chinese production (and hence output) twofold from 2003 to 2013, based on 
historical development of the industry and estimations by Huang and Ferguson (2001). If New 
Zealand kiwifruit is considered homogenous with Chinese kiwifruit, and thus competes for the 
same market share, a Chinese expansion will have a negative impact on New Zealand producers 
in terms of lower returns. 
                                                          
12 Since SPS measures are not included under the trade restriction parameter (sm) in the model, this scenario is 
modelled through a consumption shift. 
13 The effect on EU consumers depends on how easily other kiwifruit exporters might fill the gap in the EU market 
created by the stricter SPS regime on New Zealand exports. 
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7.4. Trade liberalisation through the elimination of all import tariffs. 
 
This scenario will be examined through changing all the trade restricting variables in all 
countries in the model from current import tariffs to zero, demonstrating complete trade 
liberalisation within the industry. With all import barriers eliminated worldwide, an increase in 
import demand will occur. Theoretically, exporters will respond to the change by offering 
exports at a higher price. World prices in kiwifruit consequently increase and, as a result, New 
Zealand producers are better off through higher returns. The outcome of trade liberalisation on 
producers depends upon the tariff levels of the different countries. In countries with relatively 
high tariffs, complete trade liberalistaion would result in kiwifruit being imported on the expense 
of domestic production. 
 
Table 9: Research scenarios 
0. Reference scenario  Actual conditions in 2003 
1. EU import ban  Tighter SPS policy on New Zealand exports 
 Consumption drop of 60% 
2. Chinese expansion  Chinese production doubles by 2013 
3. Trade liberalisation  All tariffs eliminated by 2013 
Source: own illustration 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion of chapter 
 
This section introduced the four main scenarios investigated in this research. The scenarios are 
run through the KIWI model as suggested and subsequently presented are the modelling results 
followed by specific discussions for each scenario. 
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8. Results and discussion 
 
This research is based on a methodology utilising three different versions of the same 
commodity included in a new trade model with kiwifruit industry-specific countries, statistics 
and assumptions. The results, focusing mainly on New Zealand producer returns, of the three 
different scenarios are given below. Other key results are also presented. All scenario outcomes 
are compared to the baseline scenario predictions in 2013. 
 
 
8.1. EU consumption drop, reducing New Zealand imports through 
an SPS policy 
 
This scenario illustrates a large reduction in EU demand for New Zealand kiwifruit, through the 
introduction of an SPS policy. This import restricting measure is a form of a non-tariff trade 
barrier, and is introduced to protect the domestic market from imports that could potentially be a 
threat to human, animal or plant health. The implementation of such a measure occurred in 1992, 
when Italian authorities threatened to take the New Zealand kiwifruit industry to court, claiming 
that the chemical residue levels of the imported shippings from New Zealand were significantly 
above Italy’s allowed standards. As a result, imports were completely cut off and New Zealand 
producers suffered greatly in terms of reduced producer returns. The SPS measure is in this case 
targeting New Zealand exports to the EU, which represent 60 percent of total New Zealand 
kiwifruit exports in 2003. 
 
By 2013, the effects of this dramatic reduction in European Union consumption of New Zealand 
kiwifruit result in a 28 percent reduction (compared to baseline scenario in 2013) in producer 
returns for green kiwifruit and 11 and 21 percent reductions in producer returns for gold and 
organic green kiwifruit respectively. New Zealand kiwifruit exports in 2013 will have fallen by 
13 percent, three percent, and 17 percent respectively for green, gold and organic green kiwifruit. 
 
The EU constitutes a significant player on the international kiwifruit market. It is the main 
kiwifruit consuming region and any potential import ban it introduces would have a significant 
negative impact on the New Zealand industry. The green and green organic sectors are especially 
affected, since a substantial share of total New Zealand exports of these varieties are shipped to 
Europe. An EU introduction of an SPS policy does not affect the New Zealand gold kiwifruit 
industry as significantly as the other two varieties. Changes in exports and producer returns are 
projected to be significantly smaller for gold than for green and green organic. This could 
possibly be explained by the fact that New Zealand is the world’s sole exporter of this variety 
and there would be other potential destinations for New Zealand gold kiwifruit, should the EU 
completely ban imports of all varieties.  
 
Other kiwifruit consuming and producing countries appear to be significantly affected by this 
policy shock as well. Consumption logically falls in the EU countries, whereas in countries such 
as the U.S., Japan and Australia consumption of green kiwifruit rises. This could possibly be due 
to a redistribution of New Zealand exports to other consuming markets, when access is denied to 
the EU. 
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Table 10: Scenario 1 – EU consumption drop through an SPS policy 
2013 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU 21% 8% 16% -26%   -20% 7%   5% 31% 8% 53% 
BE 21% 8% 16%             -48% -89% -39% 
CI 21% 8% 16% -28% -11% -21% -9% -3% -7% 31% 8% 53% 
CL 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 31%   14% 
EO 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
EN 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
FR 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -36% 
GM 21% 8% 16%             -48% -89% -39% 
GR 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -48% -89% -39% 
IT 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -38% -88% -22% 
JP 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 31% 8% 53% 
NZ 21% 8% 16% -28% -11% -21% -9% -3% -7% 31% 8% 53% 
SP 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% -68% -89% -36% 
UK 21% 8% 16%             -45% -89% -34% 
US 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 70% 8% 136% 
RW 21% 8% 16% -28%   -21% -9%   -7% 50% 8% -7% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
 
8.2. Chinese production doubles by 2013.  
 
This scenario illustrates the effects of a Chinese production expansion, doubling the country’s 
kiwifruit output by 2013, compared to the 2003 base year. This is modelled through increasing 
Chinese production (qp) twofold gradually from base year 2003 to 2013. No productivity 
improvements are incorporated in the scenario modelled, which probably understates the output 
expansion that might be possible.  
 
The production increase causes world producer and consumer prices to fall and world kiwifruit 
consumption to increase, resulting in a new equilibrium. Chinese producer returns increase 
dramatically at the expense of the world kiwifruit industry. China consequently moves from 
being a net importer to a net exporter. The effects of increased availability of Chinese kiwifruit 
are simulated to reduce both New Zealand producer returns and exported quantities, as theory 
would predict. New Zealand grower returns for green, gold and green organic kiwifruit are 
consequently reduced by 16 percent, 19 percent and nine percent respectively. New Zealand 
kiwifruit export quantities in 2013 will have fallen by seven percent, six percent, and five percent 
respectively for green, gold and organic green kiwifruit. 
 
The primary variety currently being expanded in China is conventional green kiwifruit, which 
could potentially constitute the country’s strongest chance of success on the international market. 
Therefore, New Zealand market access and future exports of green conventional kiwifruit could 
be the variety that is threatened the most by China’s potential expansion. This can be confirmed 
through the result of this scenario, where New Zealand exports for green kiwifruit are reduced by 
the most (compared to the other varieties).  
 
China is the only other country, apart from New Zealand, that presently produces gold kiwifruit. 
New Zealand is currently the only exporter of this variety. However, the above scenario shifts 
China to being a net exporter of gold kiwifruit. This constitutes a challenge for the New Zealand 
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kiwifruit industry, suddenly facing a direct competitor on the world market in this variety. The 
scenarios result in reduced New Zealand gold kiwifruit exports and the largest fall in New 
Zealand producer returns out of the three varieties considered.  
 
The organic sector is the least affected variety in New Zealand. The model projects a reduction 
in New Zealand producer returns of around half the magnitude of the falls seen in the other two 
varieties (20 percent compared to 36 and 37 percent). This could potentially be due to the fact 
that the organic kiwifruit industry is not particularly developed in China and does not pose a 
significant threat to the New Zealand organic industry. The scenario still affects the organic 
sector negatively, but not nearly as significantly. The quality issues mentioned earlier would be a 
reason why the organic sector is not as developed in China as in other major producing countries. 
 
Kiwifruit producers worldwide are similarly negatively affected in this scenario. This shows, yet 
again, the significant impact China could have on the world market. Due to increased availability 
of kiwifruit, consumption increases worldwide. The expansion of the gold variety changes China 
to a net exporter thereof and subsequently provides the world market with the first competitor to 
New Zealand in terms of exports of golden kiwifruit. This increases consumption dramatically 
worldwide, but consequently also affects New Zealand producer returns of golden kiwifruit more 
negatively than the other two scenarios. 
 
 
Table 11: Scenario 2 – Chinese production doubles by 2013. 
2013 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU -12% -14% -6% -15%   -8% -4%   -2% 12% 49% 9% 
BE -12% -14% -6%             11% 48% 8% 
CI -12% -14% -6% 67% 63% 83% 90% 89% 95% 12% 49% 9% 
CL -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12%   -3% 
EO -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
EN -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
FR -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 14% 55% 10% 
GM -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 11% 48% 8% 
GR -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
IT -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 22% 83% 19% 
JP -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
NZ -12% -14% -6% -16% -19% -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
SP -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 15% 57% 11% 
UK -12% -14% -6%       -5%   -3% 15% 59% 12% 
US -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
RW -12% -14% -6% -16%   -9% -5%   -3% 12% 49% 9% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
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8.3. Trade liberalisation through the elimination of all import tariffs 
 
By removing all tariffs in all countries by 2013, a trade liberalisation scenario was modelled. 
This was expected to increase world prices due to an increase in import demand and 
consequently increase producer returns for exporting countries with low tariffs. Due to the multi-
lateral removal of trade barriers, New Zealand grower returns increase for green, gold and green 
organic kiwifruit by 14 percent, 19 percent and 14 percent respectively. World market prices rise 
significantly for green, gold and green organic by ten percent, 13 percent and 10 percent 
respectively. This gives New Zealand an incentive to increase production by four percent for 
green, five percent for gold and four percent for green organic. New Zealand export quantities 
for green, gold, and green organic kiwifruit increase similarly by five percent, five percent and 
eight percent respectively. 
 
In China, where the relatively high tariff (20 percent) is removed, the domestic price falls and 
consumption increases by eight percent for green, 11 percent for gold and 26 percent for green 
organic. China stays a net importer and increases imports as well. China is the largest consumer 
of gold kiwifruit, which is illustrated by the increase in quantity consumed were trade to be 
liberalised. Since New Zealand is the only current exporter of gold kiwifruit, the increase in 
Chinese demand is largely met by increased New Zealand exports. 
 
Europe drops its relatively low tariff (eight percent) and as a result of complete trade 
liberalisation domestic EU price rises for both consumers and producers. Producer returns 
actually increase by two percent, which indicates that EU producers are better off if the world 
kiwifruit market were to be completely liberalised. 
 
The implication of trade liberalisation relative to countries’ different import tariff levels are 
clearly illustrated in this scenario. The following table demonstrates how producers in countries 
with no current trade restrictions on kiwifruit; New Zealand, Australia and Chile; are similarly 
better off from trade liberalisation. Japan, with its relatively low tariff of seven percent, will 
enjoy a four percent increase on green kiwifruit producer returns. Grower returns for EU green 
kiwifruit producers (current import tariff of eight percent) will increase by two percent. The 
United States will experience the lowest positive effect on green kiwifruit returns, only one 
percent, due to their import tariff level of nine percent. 
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Table 12: Scenario 3 – Trade liberalisation  
2013 
  Producer Price Producer Returns Quantity Produced Quantity Consumed 
Country Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic Green Gold Organic 
AU 10% 13% 10% 13%   13% 3%   3% -5% -28% -19% 
BE 2% 5% 2%             0% -13% -2% 
CI -9% -6% -9% -12% -8% -12% -4% -2% -4% 8% 11% 26% 
CL 10% 13% 10% 14%   14% 4%   4% -5%   -5% 
EO 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
EN 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
FR 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -15% -2% 
GM 2% 5% 2%             0% -13% -2% 
GR 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -14% -2% 
IT 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% -1% -19% -4% 
JP 3% 6% 2% 4%   4% 1%   1% 0% -16% -4% 
NZ 10% 13% 10% 14% 19% 14% 4% 5% 4% -5% -28% -19% 
SP 2% 5% 2% 2%   2% 1%   1% 0% -15% -3% 
UK 2% 5% 2%             0% -15% -3% 
US 1% 4% 1% 1%   1% 0%   0% 1% -12% 0% 
RW 10% 13% 10% 14%   14% 4%   4% -5% -28%   
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
The rise in EU prices can be explained through the increase in Chinese imports. The 
consumption drop in the EU compared to the consumption increase    in China reflects that most 
increase in production worldwide is consumed by China. The model calculates the difference in 
population between the EU and China to be as much as 70 million by 2013, indicating that it is 
not unlikely that Chinese demand for kiwifruit will increase to the extreme of affecting EU 
prices. With China being such a significant and influential player it is theoretically defendable 
that the model predicts a consumption drop in countries where tariffs are relatively low and a 
significant boost in consumption levels where the eliminated import tariff was initially relatively 
high. 
 
The following table summarises the effects on New Zealand producer returns for the different 
scenarios. It illustrates that the scenario with the most harmful impact on the New Zealand 
kiwifruit industry proved to be the EU introduction of an SPS policy. In this case the green 
kiwifruit sector experiences the most significant negative impact on grower returns (-28 percent). 
Out of the three scenarios the one on trade liberalisation proves to have the most positive impact 
on the New Zealand kiwifruit industry in terms of higher producer returns of golden kiwifruit 
(+19 percent).  
 
Table 13: Summarised effects on New Zealand producer returns 
Variety  1. EU SPS policy 2. China production x 2 3.Trade liberalisation 
Green -28% -16% +14% 
Gold -11% -19% +19% 
Organic -21% -9% +14% 
Source: own illustration, 2007 
 
 
8.4. Conclusion of chapter 
 
This section introduced the model scenarios developed for this research. The objective of this 
thesis has been to study trade related issues concerning the global kiwifruit industry and their 
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impact on New Zealand producers. Relevant scenarios were developed in order to investigate the 
most likely potential future challenges facing the industry. They were consequently run through 
the KIWI trade model and impacts on New Zealand producer returns were finally quantified in 
order to evaluate the scope of these particular changes. 
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9. Conclusion 
 
New Zealand was the first country in the world to develop a commercial kiwifruit industry.  The 
emergence and development of competitors in Italy, France, Japan and the USA during the 
1980s put pressure on New Zealand to maintain market access. This became even more 
important as a significant threat appeared with the development of a Chilean kiwifruit industry, 
representing direct competition to New Zealand in the Southern hemisphere.  
 
New Zealand has developed its kiwifruit industry over several decades and currently enjoys a 
competitive advantage in several areas. The KiwiGreen production management system, the 
development of the Gold variety and the twelve month supply plan are some of the main 
strategies and production programmes leading to these advantages that constitute the reason for 
the relatively high international price premiums that New Zealand kiwifruit benefits from today. 
ZESPRI is the country’s worldwide kiwifruit distributor through a single desk seller system. 
 
The global kiwifruit industry is currently undergoing changes on both the demand and supply 
sides. The most fundamental challenge the industry will be confronted by shortly is the 
increasing global supply of kiwifruit. China constitutes the country with the most potential to 
increase the supply of Green kiwifruit on the world market in the nearest future. The import tariff 
is still the most widely applied trade restriction within the kiwifruit industry. However, other 
non-tariff trade barriers such as the SPS measure are becoming more commonly used and 
therefore one of the focal points of this research. 
 
The analysis of current trade-related issues in the kiwifruit market is well suited to a partial 
equilibrium model approach. However, there are very few quantitative models in the 
international literature that consider kiwifruit, let alone different varieties of kiwifruit, and those 
that do exist do not adequately incorporate trade aspects. There has been no specific analytical 
framework available to examine changes in the dynamics of the kiwifruit industry in New 
Zealand.  
 
In order to investigate and answer the research questions of this thesis, a modified and industry-
specific version of a partial equilibrium framework was developed and used. The KIWI model is 
a multi-country, three-commodity partial equilibrium model focusing on the kiwifruit industry. 
The model is used to quantify price, supply, demand and net trade effects of various policy 
changes and is calibrated to year 2003 and simulations are carried out up to 2013. The KIWI 
model includes the major kiwifruit producers and consumers, specified by 13 countries, and the 
commodities included are green kiwifruit, gold kiwifruit, and organic green kiwifruit.  
 
Three cases, illustrating potential scenarios that may face the global kiwifruit industry in the near 
future, have been modelled and analysed in this thesis. The scenarios included a potential EU 
drop in demand due to a stricter SPS policy towards New Zealand kiwifruit, a scenario where 
Chinese production doubles by the year 2013 and finally a trade liberalisation scenario where all 
tariffs currently imposed on the global kiwifruit industry were removed. The results illustrate 
interesting effects on countries included in the new kiwifruit model and New Zealand in 
particular. The consequences of the potential scenarios on New Zealand producer returns were 
estimated in order to quantify changes executed by the model. 
 
A considerable drop in EU demand for New Zealand kiwifruit, due to an introduction of an SPS 
measure, significantly reduces total exports to the world from New Zealand and lowers producer 
returns. New Zealand producers are hence negatively affected by a potential EU introduction of 
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an SPS policy. Italy has utilised this measure before, and with the increasing use of non-tariff 
trade barriers worldwide, it is therefore not unlikely that this scenario could take place in the near 
future.  
 
China is currently expanding its kiwifruit production at a significant pace. A scenario was 
developed where total production doubles by 2013. This may potentially be an understatement of 
the likely expansion in Chinese kiwifruit production, as it does not include productivity changes. 
The effects of increased availability of Chinese kiwifruit have a significant negative impact on 
New Zealand producer returns and exported quantities, albeit not as dramatically as in the 
scenario that considers the EU’s introduction of an SPS policy. 
 
A trade liberalisation scenario was modelled through the removal of all tariffs in all countries by 
2013. World market prices rise significantly for all varieties giving New Zealand an incentive to 
increase production and exports. New Zealand producer returns increase as a result. China 
increases its imports and consumption significantly, which could possibly explain the rise in EU 
prices. The scenario, interestingly enough, illustrates that EU producers are better off, through 
higher producer returns, if the world kiwifruit market were to be completely liberalised. 
 
The result of this scenario also illustrates the importance of using a trade model, including 
several interacting actors and factors. A simple partial equilibrium supply and demand diagram 
of any of the European kiwifruit consuming countries would suggest an outcome of increased 
demand and higher imports if tariffs were to be removed completely. The calculations and 
simulations by the model clearly show the complex and important interlinkages between various 
producing and consuming countries. This highlights how an appropriately-calibrated trade model 
can more accurately simulate a result that is closer to a real world situation. 
 
It is clearly observed, through both the Chinese expansion scenario and the trade liberalisation 
scenario, what a potential impact and future role China has as a world market player. It is 
projected that a significant expansion of the industry will change the country from being a net 
importer to a net exporter, establishing itself on the world market as a significant provider of 
especially green and gold kiwifruit. The organic sector is still under development and not as 
likely to affect the world market as significantly as the other two varieties. 
 
Regular import tariffs are increasingly being substituted by non-tariff trade barriers such as SPS 
measures. The introduction of such a non-tariff trade barrier against kiwifruit imports could 
potentially restrict future trade of the commodity, especially if introduced by a significant 
consumer market such as the EU. Import restrictions, classified as SPS measures, have had a 
detrimental impact on the New Zealand industry in the past and could come to play a more 
significant role on the future world market of kiwifruit. 
 
With several issues challenging world trade in kiwifruit it becomes important to highlight the 
advantages of the New Zealand industry. The varieties where New Zealand benefits from high 
premiums (green organic and gold) generally appear to be the least affected by various 
international production and policy shocks. In the scenario where production expands in the 
Chinese industry, the New Zealand organic industry is the least affected variety in terms of loss 
in producer returns. The EU import ban scenario causes the least significant effect on the New 
Zealand gold variety sector. These results illustrate and confirm the competitive advantage that 
New Zealand has built up over the past decades and emphasise the importance of constantly 
maintaining and improving these qualities.  
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Out of the three scenarios in this research, the second one illustrating an expansion of the 
Chinese kiwifruit industry may be considered as the most realistic. New Zealand, and other 
major producing countries, needs to be prepared for global expansion by differentiating 
themselves from China through continued investment in quality assurance and the development 
of new varieties and branding strategies. 
 
New Zealand, and other countries, needs to take caution against possible introduction of non-
tariff trade barriers such as SPS policies, especially if potentially imposed by main consuming 
economies like the EU. 
 
One way of overcoming potential threats and challenges would be to keep pushing for trade 
liberalisation in the kiwifruit sector, which according to this research, has a significant positive 
impact on New Zealand producer returns (and those in most other regions).  
 
 
9.1. Limitations 
 
This study has some limitations. It is important to mention that the KIWI model is still under 
construction. Data has been difficult to obtain, especially for the green organic and gold sectors. 
Several assumptions and estimations had to be made (presented in chapter six), which limits the 
robustness of the model and hence the study. The production costs and quantities, consumption 
prices and quantities and price elasticities considered in this model would benefit from further 
empirical investigation. The thesis has tried to maintain consistency through the use of as few 
and as neutral databases as possible. This proved to be difficult, and data had to be obtained from 
many different and individual country-specific sources.  
 
Data on kiwifruit policies were also difficult to obtain. There was assumed no producer and 
consumer support or taxes for kiwifruit worldwide. The import tariff constitutes the single trade 
policy included in this research and was obtained from a few different sources (presented in 
chapter five). No SPS or TBT measures are included at this stage. 
 
In this research three different varieties of kiwifruit (green, gold and green organic) have been 
considered. Other varieties can be found on the world market as well, but are not as prominent. 
The objective of this research has also been to estimate impacts on New Zealand producer 
returns, and New Zealand specific varieties were hence selected.  
 
There are also other countries influencing world trade in kiwifruit, such as Iran, Mexico, South 
Korea and Taiwan. Due to their relative insignificance in the global kiwifruit market, compared 
to other countries included in the model, they were excluded and accounted for under the “rest of 
world” grouping. 
 
 
9.2. Implications for further research 
 
Future research may include the development of an improved dataset with revised quantities, 
prices, policies and elasticities. This would add robustness and accuracy to modelling results.  
 
As previously mentioned, New Zealand can command a premium in global markets due to 
various long standing industry factors, which would suggest that all kiwifruit are not the same. 
However, for simplicity and modelling purposes all green kiwifruit are considered as 
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homogenous in this study. Further differentiation between varieties and quality of kiwifruit is 
therefore suggested for future research. 
 
One possible option for future research would be to include further policies such as non-tariff 
trade barriers and environmental policies such as carbon taxes. 
 
Another approach to take in the future would include adding seasonality as a factor in the model. 
This does indeed play a significant role in how world trade in kiwifruit is composed today.  
 
Another area for future research involves including monopolistic competition in the model. This 
would facilitate an investigation of the impacts of New Zealand potentially losing ZESPRI as a 
single desk seller. 
 
 
9.3. Policy implications 
 
The approach taken in this research is novel in two ways. Firstly, this represents the first use of 
an international trade model focused specifically on kiwifruit. Secondly, the study considers key 
aspects of the kiwifruit industry and links these to international trade in the sector. The realistic 
scenarios developed in this research provide an understanding of the potential threats and 
opportunities facing the industry. This study identifies the possible impacts on producer returns 
and thus may provide decision-makers with important insights for future investment and policy 
developments. 
 
A potential expansion of the Chinese kiwifruit industry may be considered as the most realistic 
scenario in this research.  New Zealand, and other major producing countries, needs to be 
prepared for global expansion and maintain market access through product differentiation and 
intense marketing. 
 
Given the potentially significant impacts of non-tariff barriers such as punitive SPS measures, 
the New Zealand kiwifruit industry should continue to support the New Zealand government in 
its efforts to maintain an open, transparent and robust global trading system. 
 
According to this research, multilateral trade liberalisation has a significant positive impact on 
not only New Zealand producer returns, but on those of other major producing countries as well. 
One way of balancing potential threats and challenges would therefore be to keep advocating 
further trade liberalisation of the kiwifruit sector in future trade negotiations. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Countries included in the model 
ID Country ID Country 
AU Australia GR Greece 
BE Belgium IT Italy 
CI China JP Japan 
CL Chile NZ New Zealand 
EO EU Old (15) SP Spain 
EN EU New (10) UK United Kingdom 
FR France US United States 
GM Germany RW Rest of World 
 
Table A2: Kiwifruit variety coverage of the model 
ID Variety 
KW Kiwifruit green 
KG Kiwifruit gold 
KO Kiwifruit green organic 
 
Table A3: Model variables
Variable Description 
pp Producer price ($/t) 
pc Consumer price ($/t) 
pt Trade price ($/t) 
qp Quantity production (000 mt) 
qc Quantity consumption (000 mt) 
qt Quantity net trade (000 mt) 
qe Quantity ending stocks (000 mt) 
fp Shift in production 
fc Shift in consumption 
fe Shift in ending stocks 
sm Producer market subsidy, fees, levies, direct payments, other ($/mt) 
cm Consumer market subsidy and other ($/mt) 
lib Liberalisation (0=lib, 1=continued full support)  
gdp Gross Domestic Producer index (1979=100) 
pop Population (000) 
xrt Exchange rate (local currency/$) 
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Table A4: Equations in model  
 
Australia 
AUptKW 1.506253*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUptKG 1.506251*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUptKO 1.506253*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/AUxrt)^1     
AUppKW 1*0+MAX(AUptKW*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKW),1)    
AUppKG 1*0+MAX(AUptKG*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKG),1)    
AUppKO 1*0+MAX(AUptKO*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUsmKO),1)    
AUpcKW 1*0+MAX(AUptKW*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKW),1)    
AUpcKG 1*0+MAX(AUptKG*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKG),1)    
AUpcKO 1*0+MAX(AUptKO*(1-AUlib)*(1+AUcmKO),1)    
AUqpKW 0.3333874*AUfpKW*AUppKW^.3     
AUqpKG 0*AUfpKG*AUppKG^.3      
AUqpKO 0.01539598*AUfpKO*AUppKO^.3     
AUqeKW 0.003412969*AUfeKW*AUqpKW     
AUqeKG 2007*AUfeKG*AUqpKG      
AUqeKO 0.06666667*AUfeKO*AUqpKO      
AUqtKW 0+0+AUqpKW-AUqcKW-(AUqeKW-AUqe:1KW)    
AUqtKG 0+0+AUqpKG-AUqcKG-(AUqeKG-AUqe:1KG)    
AUqtKO 0+0+AUqpKO-AUqcKO-(AUqeKO-AUqe:1KO)    
AUqcKW 
0.2450798*AUfcKW*AUpcKW^-
1.7*AUpcKG^.5*AUpcKO^.5*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
AUqcKG 1597.119*AUfcKG*AUpcKW^.5*AUpcKG^-3.4*AUpcKO^.5*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
AUqcKO 4267.716*AUfcKO*AUpcKW^.5*AUpcKG^.5*AUpcKO^-3.4*(AUgdp/AUpop)^.18*AUpop 
 
Belgium 
BEptKW 1.381579*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEptKG 1.381574*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEptKO 1.381579*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/BExrt)^1     
BEppKW 1.00644*0+MAX(BEptKW*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKW),1)    
BEppKG 1.006445*0+MAX(BEptKG*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKG),1)    
BEppKO 1.006441*0+MAX(BEptKO*(1-BElib)*(1+BEsmKO),1)    
BEpcKW 1.00644*0+MAX(BEptKW*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKW),1)    
BEpcKG 1.006445*0+MAX(BEptKG*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKG),1)    
BEpcKO 1.006441*0+MAX(BEptKO*(1-BElib)*(1+BEcmKO),1)    
BEqpKW 0*BEfpKW*BEppKW^.1      
BEqpKG 0*BEfpKG*BEppKG^.1      
BEqpKO 0*BEfpKO*BEppKO^.1      
BEqeKW 2007*BEfeKW*BEqpKW      
BEqeKG 2007*BEfeKG*BEqpKG      
BEqeKO 2007*BEfeKO*BEqpKO      
BEqtKW 0+0+BEqpKW-BEqcKW-(BEqeKW-BEqe:1KW)    
BEqtKG 0+0+BEqpKG-BEqcKG-(BEqeKG-BEqe:1KG)    
BEqtKO 0+0+BEqpKO-BEqcKO-(BEqeKO-BEqe:1KO)    
BEqcKW 
1.966542*BEfcKW*BEpcKW^-
1.67*BEpcKG^.5*BEpcKO^.5*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
BEqcKG 
13102.54*BEfcKG*BEpcKW^.5*BEpcKG^-
3.34*BEpcKO^.5*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
BEqcKO 
126366.3*BEfcKO*BEpcKW^.5*BEpcKG^.5*BEpcKO^-
3.34*(BEgdp/BEpop)^.18*BEpop 
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China 
CIptKW 0.6759459*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIptKG 0.6759381*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIptKO 0.6759422*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/CIxrt)^1     
CIppKW 1.041663*0+MAX(CIptKW*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKW),1)    
CIppKG 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKG*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKG),1)    
CIppKO 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKO*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIsmKO),1)    
CIpcKW 1.041663*0+MAX(CIptKW*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKW),1)    
CIpcKG 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKG*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKG),1)    
CIpcKO 1.041669*0+MAX(CIptKO*(1-CIlib)*(1+CIcmKO),1)    
CIqpKW 16.96128*CIfpKW*CIppKW^.4      
CIqpKG 2.891054*CIfpKG*CIppKG^.4      
CIqpKO 0.7394373*CIfpKO*CIppKO^.4      
CIqeKW 0.00004096514*CIfeKW*CIqpKW     
CIqeKG 0.000217061*CIfeKG*CIqpKG      
CIqeKO 0.0008190008*CIfeKO*CIqpKO      
CIqtKW 0+0+CIqpKW-CIqcKW-(CIqeKW-CIqe:1KW)    
CIqtKG 0+0+CIqpKG-CIqcKG-(CIqeKG-CIqe:1KG)     
CIqtKO 0+0+CIqpKO-CIqcKO-(CIqeKO-CIqe:1KO)     
CIqcKW 0.08509478*CIfcKW*CIpcKW^-1.7*CIpcKG^.5*CIpcKO^.5*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
CIqcKG 3346.101*CIfcKG*CIpcKW^.5*CIpcKG^-3.4*CIpcKO^.5*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
CIqcKO 1254.574*CIfcKO*CIpcKW^.5*CIpcKG^.5*CIpcKO^-3.4*(CIgdp/CIpop)^.18*CIpop 
 
Chile 
CLptKW 0.1374042*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLptKG 0.1374048*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLptKO 0.1374014*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/CLxrt)^1     
CLppKW 1*0+MAX(CLptKW*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKW),1)    
CLppKG 1*0+MAX(CLptKG*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKG),1)    
CLppKO 1*0+MAX(CLptKO*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLsmKO),1)    
CLpcKW 1*0+MAX(CLptKW*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKW),1)    
CLpcKG 1*0+MAX(CLptKG*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKG),1)    
CLpcKO 1*0+MAX(CLptKO*(1-CLlib)*(1+CLcmKO),1)    
CLqpKW 17.9602*CLfpKW*CLppKW^.4      
CLqpKG 0*CLfpKG*CLppKG^.4      
CLqpKO 0.7827037*CLfpKO*CLppKO^.4      
CLqeKW 0.00000552868*CLfeKW*CLqpKW*CLqcKW    
CLqeKG 2007*CLfeKG*CLqpKG      
CLqeKO 0.0016*CLfeKO*CLqpKO      
CLqtKW 0+0+CLqpKW-CLqcKW-(CLqeKW-CLqe:1KW)    
CLqtKG 0+0+CLqpKG-CLqcKG-(CLqeKG-CLqe:1KG)    
CLqtKO 0+0+CLqpKO-CLqcKO-(CLqeKO-CLqe:1KO)    
CLqcKW 
0.05112034*CLfcKW*CLpcKW^-
1.7*CLpcKG^.5*CLpcKO^.5*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop 
CLqcKG 
0*CLfcKG*CLpcKW^.5*CLpcKG^-
3.4*CLpcKO^.5*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop  
CLqcKO 8.226361*CLfcKO*CLpcKW^.5*CLpcKG^.5*CLpcKO^-3.4*(CLgdp/CLpop)^.18*CLpop 
 
 
 
 
EU (Old) 
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EOptKW 1.5428*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOptKG 1.542801*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOptKO 1.542804*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/EOxrt)^1      
EOppKW 
1.006441*0+MAX(EOptKW*(1-
EOlib)*(1+EOsmKW),1)     
EOppKG 1.00644*0+MAX(EOptKG*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOsmKG),1)     
EOppKO 1.006443*0+MAX(EOptKO*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOsmKO),1)     
EOpcKW 
1.006441*0+MAX(EOptKW*(1-
EOlib)*(1+EOcmKW),1)     
EOpcKG 1.00644*0+MAX(EOptKG*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOcmKG),1)     
EOpcKO 1.006443*0+MAX(EOptKO*(1-EOlib)*(1+EOcmKO),1)     
EOqpKW 0.5572434*EOfpKW*EOppKW^.4      
EOqpKG 0*EOfpKG*EOppKG^.4       
EOqpKO 0.02428437*EOfpKO*EOppKO^.4      
EOqeKW 0.0009478673*EOfeKW*EOqpKW      
EOqeKG 2007*EOfeKG*EOqpKG       
EOqeKO 0.01895735*EOfeKO*EOqpKO       
EOqtKW 0+0+EOqpKW-EOqcKW-(EOqeKW-EOqe:1KW)     
EOqtKG 0+0+EOqpKG-EOqcKG-(EOqeKG-EOqe:1KG)     
EOqtKO 0.0025+0+EOqpKO-EOqcKO-(EOqeKO-EOqe:1KO)     
EOqcKW 0.0667418*EOfcKW*EOpcKW^-1.7*EOpcKG^.5*EOpcKO^.5*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop 
EOqcKG 
678.6533*EOfcKG*EOpcKW^.5*EOpcKG^-
3.4*EOpcKO^.5*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop  
EOqcKO 
4108.244*EOfcKO*EOpcKW^.5*EOpcKG^.5*EOpcKO^-
3.4*(EOgdp/EOpop)^.18*EOpop  
 
EU (New) 
ENptKW 0.8987237*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENptKG 0.8987281*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENptKO 0.8987296*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/ENxrt)^1      
ENppKW 
1.006439*0+MAX(ENptKW*(1-
ENlib)*(1+ENsmKW),1)     
ENppKG 1.006441*0+MAX(ENptKG*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENsmKG),1)     
ENppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(ENptKO*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENsmKO),1)     
ENpcKW 
1.006439*0+MAX(ENptKW*(1-
ENlib)*(1+ENcmKW),1)     
ENpcKG 1.006441*0+MAX(ENptKG*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENcmKG),1)     
ENpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(ENptKO*(1-ENlib)*(1+ENcmKO),1)     
ENqpKW 0.005245129*ENfpKW*ENppKW^.4      
ENqpKG 0*ENfpKG*ENppKG^.4       
ENqpKO 0.0002285797*ENfpKO*ENppKO^.4      
ENqeKW 0.125*ENfeKW*ENqpKW       
ENqeKG 2007*ENfeKG*ENqpKG       
ENqeKO 2.5*ENfeKO*ENqpKO       
ENqtKW 0+0+ENqpKW-ENqcKW-(ENqeKW-ENqe:1KW)     
ENqtKG 0+0+ENqpKG-ENqcKG-(ENqeKG-ENqe:1KG)     
ENqtKO 0.006+0+ENqpKO-ENqcKO-(ENqeKO-ENqe:1KO)     
ENqcKW 0.01708097*ENfcKW*ENpcKW^-1.7*ENpcKG^.5*ENpcKO^.5*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop 
ENqcKG 
69.59186*ENfcKG*ENpcKW^.5*ENpcKG^-
3.4*ENpcKO^.5*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop  
ENqcKO 
326.2023*ENfcKO*ENpcKW^.5*ENpcKG^.5*ENpcKO^-
3.4*(ENgdp/ENpop)^.18*ENpop  
 
 
France  
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FRptKW 1.735224*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRptKG 1.735218*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRptKO 1.735225*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/FRxrt)^1     
FRppKW 1.006441*0+MAX(FRptKW*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKW),1)    
FRppKG 1.006443*0+MAX(FRptKG*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKG),1)    
FRppKO 1.006442*0+MAX(FRptKO*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRsmKO),1)    
FRpcKW 1.006441*0+MAX(FRptKW*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKW),1)    
FRpcKG 1.006443*0+MAX(FRptKG*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKG),1)    
FRpcKO 1.006442*0+MAX(FRptKO*(1-FRlib)*(1+FRcmKO),1)    
FRqpKW 3.736172*FRfpKW*FRppKW^.4      
FRqpKG 0*FRfpKG*FRppKG^.4      
FRqpKO 0.1629523*FRfpKO*FRppKO^.4      
FRqeKW 0.00013488*FRfeKW*FRqpKW      
FRqeKG 2007*FRfeKG*FRqpKG      
FRqeKO 0.002695418*FRfeKO*FRqpKO      
FRqtKW 0+0+FRqpKW-FRqcKW-(FRqeKW-FRqe:1KW)    
FRqtKG 0+0+FRqpKG-FRqcKG-(FRqeKG-FRqe:1KG)    
FRqtKO 0+0+FRqpKO-FRqcKO-(FRqeKO-FRqe:1KO)    
FRqcKW 
1.525046*FRfcKW*FRpcKW^-
1.83*FRpcKG^.5*FRpcKO^.5*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
FRqcKG 
39970.21*FRfcKG*FRpcKW^.5*FRpcKG^-
3.65*FRpcKO^.5*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
FRqcKO 
272649.8*FRfcKO*FRpcKW^.5*FRpcKG^.5*FRpcKO^-
3.65*(FRgdp/FRpop)^.18*FRpop 
 
Germany 
GMptKW 1.529789*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMptKG 1.52979*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMptKO 1.529794*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/GMxrt)^1      
GMppKW 1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKW*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMsmKW),1)    
GMppKG 
1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKG*(1-
GMlib)*(1+GMsmKG),1)     
GMppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(GMptKO*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMsmKO),1)     
GMpcKW 1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKW*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMcmKW),1)    
GMpcKG 
1.006443*0+MAX(GMptKG*(1-
GMlib)*(1+GMcmKG),1)     
GMpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(GMptKO*(1-GMlib)*(1+GMcmKO),1)     
GMqpKW 0*GMfpKW*GMppKW^.1       
GMqpKG 0*GMfpKG*GMppKG^.1       
GMqpKO 0*GMfpKO*GMppKO^.1       
GMqeKW 2007*GMfeKW*GMqpKW       
GMqeKG 2007*GMfeKG*GMqpKG       
GMqeKO 2007*GMfeKO*GMqpKO       
GMqtKW 0+0+GMqpKW-GMqcKW-(GMqeKW-GMqe:1KW)     
GMqtKG 0+0+GMqpKG-GMqcKG-(GMqeKG-GMqe:1KG)     
GMqtKO 0+0+GMqpKO-GMqcKO-(GMqeKO-GMqe:1KO)     
GMqcKW 0.4332858*GMfcKW*GMpcKW^-1.67*GMpcKG^.5*GMpcKO^.5*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
GMqcKG 3428.474*GMfcKG*GMpcKW^.5*GMpcKG^-3.34*GMpcKO^.5*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
GMqcKO 28621.36*GMfcKO*GMpcKW^.5*GMpcKG^.5*GMpcKO^-3.34*(GMgdp/GMpop)^.22*GMpop 
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Greece 
GRptKW 0.6698709*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRptKG 0.6698701*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRptKO 0.6698644*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/GRxrt)^1      
GRppKW 1.006435*0+MAX(GRptKW*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKW),1)     
GRppKG 1.006436*0+MAX(GRptKG*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKG),1)     
GRppKO 1.006447*0+MAX(GRptKO*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRsmKO),1)     
GRpcKW 1.006435*0+MAX(GRptKW*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKW),1)     
GRpcKG 1.006436*0+MAX(GRptKG*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKG),1)     
GRpcKO 1.006447*0+MAX(GRptKO*(1-GRlib)*(1+GRcmKO),1)     
GRqpKW 4.399508*GRfpKW*GRppKW^.4       
GRqpKG 0*GRfpKG*GRppKG^.4       
GRqpKO 0.1915356*GRfpKO*GRppKO^.4       
GRqeKW 0.0001676165*GRfeKW*GRqpKW      
GRqeKG 2007*GRfeKG*GRqpKG       
GRqeKO 0.003355705*GRfeKO*GRqpKO       
GRqtKW 0+0+GRqpKW-GRqcKW-(GRqeKW-GRqe:1KW)     
GRqtKG 0+0+GRqpKG-GRqcKG-(GRqeKG-GRqe:1KG)     
GRqtKO 0.01+0+GRqpKO-GRqcKO-(GRqeKO-GRqe:1KO)     
GRqcKW 0.6391731*GRfcKW*GRpcKW^-1.7*GRpcKG^.5*GRpcKO^.5*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop 
GRqcKG 
1128.994*GRfcKG*GRpcKW^.5*GRpcKG^-
3.4*GRpcKO^.5*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop  
GRqcKO 
3655.695*GRfcKO*GRpcKW^.5*GRpcKG^.5*GRpcKO^-
3.4*(GRgdp/GRpop)^.18*GRpop  
 
Italy 
ITptKW 1.10305*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITptKG 1.103056*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITptKO 1.103055*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/ITxrt)^1     
ITppKW 1.006445*0+MAX(ITptKW*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKW),1)    
ITppKG 1.006437*0+MAX(ITptKG*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKG),1)    
ITppKO 1.006441*0+MAX(ITptKO*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITsmKO),1)    
ITpcKW 1.006445*0+MAX(ITptKW*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKW),1)    
ITpcKG 1.006437*0+MAX(ITptKG*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKG),1)    
ITpcKO 1.006441*0+MAX(ITptKO*(1-ITlib)*(1+ITcmKO),1)    
ITqpKW 19.49895*ITfpKW*ITppKW^.4      
ITqpKG 0*ITfpKG*ITppKG^.4       
ITqpKO 0.8497551*ITfpKO*ITppKO^.4      
ITqeKW 0.00003097894*ITfeKW*ITqpKW      
ITqeKG 2007*ITfeKG*ITqpKG       
ITqeKO 0.0006195787*ITfeKO*ITqpKO      
ITqtKW 0+0+ITqpKW-ITqcKW-(ITqeKW-ITqe:1KW)     
ITqtKG 0+0+ITqpKG-ITqcKG-(ITqeKG-ITqe:1KG)     
ITqtKO 0+0+ITqpKO-ITqcKO-(ITqeKO-ITqe:1KO)     
ITqcKW 270.7224*ITfcKW*ITpcKW^-2.4*ITpcKG^.5*ITpcKO^.5*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
ITqcKG 396076600*ITfcKG*ITpcKW^.5*ITpcKG^-4.8*ITpcKO^.5*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
ITqcKO 6705455000*ITfcKO*ITpcKW^.5*ITpcKG^.5*ITpcKO^-4.8*(ITgdp/ITpop)^.38*ITpop 
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Japan 
JPptKW 1.816769*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPptKG 1.816769*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPptKO 1.816775*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/JPxrt)^1     
JPppKW 1.004925*0+MAX(JPptKW*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKW),1)    
JPppKG 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKG*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKG),1)    
JPppKO 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKO*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPsmKO),1)    
JPpcKW 1.004925*0+MAX(JPptKW*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKW),1)    
JPpcKG 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKG*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKG),1)    
JPpcKO 1.004924*0+MAX(JPptKO*(1-JPlib)*(1+JPcmKO),1)    
JPqpKW 1.858429*JPfpKW*JPppKW^.4      
JPqpKG 0*JPfpKG*JPppKG^.4      
JPqpKO 0.08098941*JPfpKO*JPppKO^.4      
JPqeKW 0.0002673797*JPfeKW*JPqpKW     
JPqeKG 2007*JPfeKG*JPqpKG      
JPqeKO 0.005347594*JPfeKO*JPqpKO      
JPqtKW 0+0+JPqpKW-JPqcKW-(JPqeKW-JPqe:1KW)    
JPqtKG 0+0+JPqpKG-JPqcKG-(JPqeKG-JPqe:1KG)    
JPqtKO 0+0+JPqpKO-JPqcKO-(JPqeKO-JPqe:1KO)    
JPqcKW 0.3576792*JPfcKW*JPpcKW^-1.7*JPpcKG^.5*JPpcKO^.5*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
JPqcKG 55452.59*JPfcKG*JPpcKW^.5*JPpcKG^-3.4*JPpcKO^.5*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
JPqcKO 43854.09*JPfcKO*JPpcKW^.5*JPpcKG^.5*JPpcKO^-3.4*(JPgdp/JPpop)^.18*JPpop 
 
New Zealand 
NZptKW 1.844027*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZptKG 1.76705*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZptKO 1.632681*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/NZxrt)^1     
NZppKW 1*0+MAX(NZptKW*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKW),1)    
NZppKG 1*0+MAX(NZptKG*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKG),1)    
NZppKO 1*0+MAX(NZptKO*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZsmKO),1)    
NZpcKW 1*0+MAX(NZptKW*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKW),1)    
NZpcKG 1*0+MAX(NZptKG*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKG),1)    
NZpcKO 1*0+MAX(NZptKO*(1-NZlib)*(1+NZcmKO),1)    
NZqpKW 13.25873*NZfpKW*NZppKW^.4      
NZqpKG 1.446327*NZfpKG*NZppKG^.4      
NZqpKO 0.3852864*NZfpKO*NZppKO^.4      
NZqeKW 0.00003835238*NZfeKW*NZqpKW     
NZqeKG 0.0003229974*NZfeKG*NZqpKG      
NZqeKO 0.001207729*NZfeKO*NZqpKO      
NZqtKW 0+0+NZqpKW-NZqcKW-(NZqeKW-NZqe:1KW)    
NZqtKG 0+0+NZqpKG-NZqcKG-(NZqeKG-NZqe:1KG)    
NZqtKO 0+0+NZqpKO-NZqcKO-(NZqeKO-NZqe:1KO)    
NZqcKW 1.596514*NZfcKW*NZpcKW^-1.7*NZpcKG^.5*NZpcKO^.5*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
NZqcKG 8763.511*NZfcKG*NZpcKW^.5*NZpcKG^-3.4*NZpcKO^.5*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
NZqcKO 62736.81*NZfcKO*NZpcKW^.5*NZpcKG^.5*NZpcKO^-3.4*(NZgdp/NZpop)^.18*NZpop 
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Spain 
SPptKW 1.354032*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPptKG 1.354027*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPptKO 1.354027*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/SPxrt)^1      
SPppKW 1.006439*0+MAX(SPptKW*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKW),1)     
SPppKG 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKG*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKG),1)     
SPppKO 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKO*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPsmKO),1)     
SPpcKW 1.006439*0+MAX(SPptKW*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKW),1)     
SPpcKG 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKG*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKG),1)     
SPpcKO 1.006442*0+MAX(SPptKO*(1-SPlib)*(1+SPcmKO),1)     
SPqpKW 0.5565001*SPfpKW*SPppKW^.4      
SPqpKG 0*SPfpKG*SPppKG^.4       
SPqpKO 0.02425202*SPfpKO*SPppKO^.4      
SPqeKW 0.001*SPfeKW*SPqpKW       
SPqeKG 2007*SPfeKG*SPqpKG       
SPqeKO 0.02*SPfeKO*SPqpKO       
SPqtKW 38.11+0+SPqpKW-SPqcKW-(SPqeKW-SPqe:1KW)     
SPqtKG 0+0+SPqpKG-SPqcKG-(SPqeKG-SPqe:1KG)     
SPqtKO 0+0+SPqpKO-SPqcKO-(SPqeKO-SPqe:1KO)     
SPqcKW 200.2682*SPfcKW*SPpcKW^-1.88*SPpcKG^.5*SPpcKO^.5*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
SPqcKG 6154608*SPfcKG*SPpcKW^.5*SPpcKG^-3.76*SPpcKO^.5*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
SPqcKO 
57563520*SPfcKO*SPpcKW^.5*SPpcKG^.5*SPpcKO^-
3.76*(SPgdp/SPpop)^.94*SPpop  
 
United Kingdom 
UKptKW 1.434212*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKptKG 1.434211*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKptKO 1.43422*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/UKxrt)^1     
UKppKW 1.006443*0+MAX(UKptKW*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKW),1)    
UKppKG 1.006444*0+MAX(UKptKG*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKG),1)    
UKppKO 1.00644*0+MAX(UKptKO*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKsmKO),1)    
UKpcKW 1.006443*0+MAX(UKptKW*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKW),1)    
UKpcKG 1.006444*0+MAX(UKptKG*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKG),1)    
UKpcKO 1.00644*0+MAX(UKptKO*(1-UKlib)*(1+UKcmKO),1)    
UKqpKW 0*UKfpKW*UKppKW^.1      
UKqpKG 0*UKfpKG*UKppKG^.1      
UKqpKO 0*UKfpKO*UKppKO^.1      
UKqeKW 2007*UKfeKW*UKqpKW      
UKqeKG 2007*UKfeKG*UKqpKG      
UKqeKO 2007*UKfeKO*UKqpKO      
UKqtKW 0+0+UKqpKW-UKqcKW-(UKqeKW-UKqe:1KW)    
UKqtKG 0+0+UKqpKG-UKqcKG-(UKqeKG-UKqe:1KG)    
UKqtKO 0+0+UKqpKO-UKqcKO-(UKqeKO-UKqe:1KO)    
UKqcKW 64.00703*UKfcKW*UKpcKW^-1.91*UKpcKG^.5*UKpcKO^.5*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
UKqcKG 3189353*UKfcKG*UKpcKW^.5*UKpcKG^-3.83*UKpcKO^.5*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
UKqcKO 
10417250*UKfcKO*UKpcKW^.5*UKpcKG^.5*UKpcKO^-
3.83*(UKgdp/UKpop)^.87*UKpop 
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United States 
USptKW 0.834629*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/USxrt)^1      
USptKG 0.8346308*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/USxrt)^1      
USptKO 0.8346272*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/USxrt)^1      
USppKW 1.008166*0+MAX(USptKW*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKW),1)     
USppKG 1.008163*0+MAX(USptKG*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKG),1)     
USppKO 1.00817*0+MAX(USptKO*(1-USlib)*(1+USsmKO),1)     
USpcKW 1.008166*0+MAX(USptKW*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKW),1)     
USpcKG 1.008163*0+MAX(USptKG*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKG),1)     
USpcKO 1.00817*0+MAX(USptKO*(1-USlib)*(1+UScmKO),1)     
USqpKW 1.46379*USfpKW*USppKW^.4       
USqpKG 0*USfpKG*USppKG^.4       
USqpKO 0.08380478*USfpKO*USppKO^.4      
USqeKW 0.0004593477*USfeKW*USqpKW      
USqeKG 2007*USfeKG*USqpKG       
USqeKO 0.006993007*USfeKO*USqpKO       
USqtKW 0+0+USqpKW-USqcKW-(USqeKW-USqe:1KW)     
USqtKG 0+0+USqpKG-USqcKG-(USqeKG-USqe:1KG)     
USqtKO 0+0+USqpKO-USqcKO-(USqeKO-USqe:1KO)     
USqcKW 0.05507465*USfcKW*USpcKW^-1.7*USpcKG^.5*USpcKO^.5*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop 
USqcKG 442.549*USfcKG*USpcKW^.5*USpcKG^-3.4*USpcKO^.5*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop  
USqcKO 1095.605*USfcKO*USpcKW^.5*USpcKG^.5*USpcKO^-3.4*(USgdp/USpop)^.18*USpop  
 
Rest of World 
RWptKW 0.8007376*(MAX(WDptKW,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWptKG 0.8007402*(MAX(WDptKG,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWptKO 0.8007458*(MAX(WDptKO,1)/RWxrt)^1      
RWppKW 1*0+MAX(RWptKW*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKW),1)     
RWppKG 1*0+MAX(RWptKG*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKG),1)     
RWppKO 1*0+MAX(RWptKO*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWsmKO),1)     
RWpcKW 1*0+MAX(RWptKW*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKW),1)     
RWpcKG 1*0+MAX(RWptKG*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKG),1)     
RWpcKO 1*0+MAX(RWptKO*(1-RWlib)*(1+RWcmKO),1)     
RWqpKW 6.565275*RWfpKW*RWppKW^.4      
RWqpKG 0*RWfpKG*RWppKG^.4       
RWqpKO 1.854397*RWfpKO*RWppKO^.4       
RWqeKW 0.0001081315*RWfeKW*RWqpKW      
RWqeKG 2007*RWfeKG*RWqpKG       
RWqeKO 0.000333667*RWfeKO*RWqpKO      
RWqtKW -53.1+0+RWqpKW-RWqcKW-(RWqeKW-RWqe:1KW)     
RWqtKG 0+0+RWqpKG-RWqcKG-(RWqeKG-RWqe:1KG)     
RWqtKO 0+0+RWqpKO-RWqcKO-(RWqeKO-RWqe:1KO)     
RWqcKW 0.026887*RWfcKW*RWpcKW^-1.7*RWpcKG^.5*RWpcKO^.5*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop 
RWqcKG 206.3968*RWfcKG*RWpcKW^.5*RWpcKG^-3.4*RWpcKO^.5*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop 
RWqcKO 0*RWfcKO*RWpcKW^.5*RWpcKG^.5*RWpcKO^-3.4*(RWgdp/RWpop)^.18*RWpop  
 
World 
WDqtKW 
14.99+AUqtKW+BEqtKW+CIqtKW+CLqtKW+EOqtKW+ENqtKW+FRqtKW+GMqtKW+GRqtKW+ITqtKW+ 
JPqtKW+NZqtKW+SPqtKW+UKqtKW+USqtKW+RWqtKW 
WDqtKG 
-0.01+AUqtKG+BEqtKG+CIqtKG+CLqtKG+EOqtKG+ENqtKG+FRqtKG+GMqtKG+GRqtKG+ITqtKG+ 
JPqtKG+NZqtKG+SPqtKG+UKqtKG+USqtKG+RWqtKG  
WDqtKO 
0+AUqtKO+BEqtKO+CIqtKO+CLqtKO+EOqtKO+ENqtKO+FRqtKO+GMqtKO+GRqtKO+ITqtKO+ 
JPqtKO+NZqtKO+SPqtKO+UKqtKO+USqtKO+RWqtKO   
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Table A5: Basedata for KIWI model (year 2003) 
KIWI AU BE CI CL EO EN FR GM GR IT JP NZ SP UK  US RW WD 
ppKW 1400.86 1396.64 
785.81 
127.79 1559.62 908.52 1754.14 1546.47 677.17 1115.08 1816.83 1715 1368.79 1449.85 853 744.71 930.03 
ppKG 1807.11 1801.67 
1013.69 
164.85 2011.91 1172 2262.84 1994.95 873.55 1438.45 2343.71 2120 1765.74 1870.31 1100.37 960.68 1199.74 
ppKO 1975.21 1969.26 
1107.99 
180.18 2199.07 1281.02 2473.34 2180.52 954.81 1572.26 2561.73 2141 1929.99 2044.29 1202.73 1050.05 1311.34 
pcKW 1400.86 1396.64 
785.81 
127.79 1559.62 908.52 1754.14 1546.47 677.17 1115.08 1816.83 1715 1368.79 1449.85 853 744.71 930.03 
pcKG 1807.11 1801.67 
1013.69 
164.85 2011.91 1172 2262.84 1994.95 873.55 1438.45 2343.71 2120 1765.74 1870.31 1100.37 960.68 1199.74 
pcKO 1975.21 1969.26 
1107.99 
180.18 2199.07 1281.02 2473.34 2180.52 954.81 1572.26 2561.73 2141 1929.99 2044.29 1202.73 1050.05 1311.34 
ptKW 1400.86 1284.91 
628.65 
127.79 1434.85 835.84 1613.81 1422.75 623 1025.87 1689.65 1715 1259.29 1333.86 776.23 744.71 930.03 
ptKG 1807.11 1657.53 
810.95 
164.85 1850.96 1078.24 2081.81 1835.35 803.67 1323.38 2179.65 2120 1624.48 1720.68 1001.34 960.68 1199.74 
ptKO 1975.21 1811.72 
886.39 
180.18 2023.14 1178.54 2275.47 2006.08 878.42 1446.48 2382.41 2141 1775.59 1880.75 1094.48 1050.05 1311.34 
qpKW 2.93 0.00 244.11 125.00 10.55 0.080 74.14 0.00 59.66 322.80 37.40 260.74 10.00 0.00 21.77 92.48 1261.66 
qpKG 0.00 0.00 46.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 77.03 
qpKO 0.15 0.00 12.21 6.25 0.53 0.0040 3.71 0.00 2.98 16.14 1.87 8.28 0.50 0.00 1.43 29.97 84.01 
qcKW 16.65 97.73 264.31 14.47 61.19 47.48 83.64 84.74 44.63 115.01 87.11 23.61 97.82 31.94 46.48 144.85 1261.66 
qcKG 0.18 1.37 46.07 0.00 0.86 0.67 0.95 1.19 0.45 2.12 14.40 0.18 1.29 0.45 1.44 5.40 77.03 
qcKO 0.34 9.39 12.21 0.16 3.68 2.22 4.48 7.06 1.03 22.40 8.05 1.24 8.26 1.00 2.52 0.00 84.01 
qmKW 15.36 105.94 23.83   76.92 48.03 39.90 89.89 1.47 51.22 49.71 1.08 95.99 33.71 34.87 129.53   
qxKW 1.64 8.21 3.63 110.53 26.28 0.63 30.40 5.15 16.50 259.01 0.00 238.21 8.17 1.77 10.16 24.06   
qtKW -13.72 -97.73 -20.20 110.53 -50.64 -47.40 -9.50 -84.74 15.03 207.79 -49.71 237.13 -49.71 -31.94 -24.71 -105.47 0.00 
qtKG -0.18 -1.37 0.00 0.00 -0.86 -0.67 -0.95 -1.19 -0.45 -2.12 -14.40 30.78 -1.29 -0.45 -1.44 -5.40 0.00 
qtKO -0.19 -9.39 0.00 6.09 -3.15 -2.21 -0.77 -7.06 1.96 -6.26 -6.18 7.04 -7.76 -1.00 -1.09 29.97 0.00 
qeKW 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
qeKG 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
qeKO 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
fpKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fpKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fpKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
fcKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
feKW 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
feKG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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feKO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
smKW 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
smKG 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
smKO 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKW 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKG 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
cmKO 0.00 0.080 0.20 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.070 0.00 0.080 0.080 0.090 0.00   
lib 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
gdp 133.59 132.55 125.79 95.90 135.46 143.41 133.60 128.36 154.42 136.39 90.82 147.53 148.94 124.82 111.47 112.72 115.17 
pop 19732 10331 1291496 15663 515122 1240469 60181.00 82398 10626 57998 127214 3951 40217 60095 290343 2473392 6299228 
xrt 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table A6: Basedata scenario for KIWI model (year 2013) 
KIWI AU BE CI CL EO EN FR GM GR IT JP NZ SP UK US RW WD 
ppKW 1616,42 1601,24 870,46 147,45 1788,09 1041,61 2011,11 1773,02 776,38 1278,43 2086,13 1978,90 1569,31 1662,24 976,29 859,31 930,03 
ppKG 1995,74 1976,99 1074,72 182,06 2207,70 1286,05 2483,04 2189,08 958,56 1578,44 2575,66 2341,29 1937,57 2052,31 1205,39 1060,96 1199,74 
ppKO 2144,59 2124,45 1154,88 195,63 2372,37 1381,97 2668,25 2352,36 1030,05 1696,17 2767,78 2324,60 2082,08 2205,40 1295,29 1140,10 1311,34 
pcKW 1616,42 1601,24 870,46 147,45 1788,09 1041,61 2011,11 1773,02 776,38 1278,43 2086,13 1978,90 1569,31 1662,24 976,29 859,31 930,03 
pcKG 1995,74 1976,99 1074,72 182,06 2207,70 1286,05 2483,04 2189,08 958,56 1578,44 2575,66 2341,29 1937,57 2052,31 1205,39 1060,96 1199,74 
pcKO 2144,59 2124,45 1154,88 195,63 2372,37 1381,97 2668,25 2352,36 1030,05 1696,17 2767,78 2324,60 2082,08 2205,40 1295,29 1140,10 1311,34 
ptKW 1616,42 1482,63 725,39 147,45 1655,64 964,46 1862,14 1641,68 718,87 1183,73 1949,65 1978,90 1453,07 1539,11 895,68 859,31 1073,14 
ptKG 1995,74 1830,54 895,60 182,06 2044,16 1190,79 2299,11 2026,92 887,56 1461,51 2407,16 2341,29 1794,04 1900,28 1105,86 1060,96 1324,97 
ptKO 2144,59 1967,08 962,40 195,63 2196,64 1279,61 2470,60 2178,11 953,75 1570,52 2586,71 2324,60 1927,86 2042,03 1188,34 1140,10 1423,79 
qpKW 3,06 0,00 254,31 132,37 11,14 0,08 78,31 0,00 63,01 340,94 39,53 276,10 10,56 0,00 22,98 97,93 1453,10 
qpKG 0,00 0,00 47,16 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 32,21 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 99,46 
qpKO 0,15 0,00 12,41 6,46 0,54 0,00 3,82 0,00 3,07 16,64 1,93 8,56 0,52 0,00 1,47 30,97 87,51 
qcKW 16,91 92,37 293,49 15,36 61,13 48,21 78,31 79,58 42,36 105,77 76,89 24,70 143,31 40,79 46,58 164,56 1453,10 
qcKG 0,17 1,22 51,01 0,00 0,81 0,64 0,83 1,05 0,40 1,77 11,92 0,18 1,76 0,53 1,36 5,71 99,46 
qcKO 0,34 8,92 14,45 0,19 3,69 2,27 4,21 6,67 0,98 20,49 7,12 1,29 12,13 1,28 2,55 0,00 87,51 
qmKW 19,71 117,31 35,65   89,69 96,48 50,52 114,81 3,37 50,18 59,44 0,78 114,39 37,93 41,10 186,54   
qxKW 1,19 6,89 7,52 129,07 32,20 10,54 24,41 10,08 37,99 291,78 0,00 313,68 9,45 1,67 12,10 31,09   
qtKW -13,85 -92,37 -39,18 117,00 -49,99 -48,12 0,00 -79,58 20,65 235,17 -37,36 251,40 -94,64 -40,79 -23,60 -119,73 0,00 
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qtKG -0,17 -1,22 -3,85 0,00 -0,81 -0,64 -0,83 -1,05 -0,40 -1,77 -11,92 32,04 -1,76 -0,53 -1,36 -5,71 0,00 
qtKO -0,19 -8,92 -2,03 6,26 -3,15 -2,26 -0,39 -6,67 2,10 -3,85 -5,19 7,27 -11,61 -1,28 -1,07 30,97 0,00 
qeKW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
qeKG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
qeKO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
fpKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fpKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fpKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
fcKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKW 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKG 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
feKO 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 
smKW 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
smKG 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
smKO 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKW 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKG 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
cmKO 0,00 0,08 0,20 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,00   
lib 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
gdp 235,19 204,42 337,35 199,64 211,45 299,20 206,07 184,66 246,43 206,32 106,75 291,22 268,47 201,88 170,38 214,66 188,66 
pop 21395 10452 1374558 17280 558927 1288071 61811 82514 10780 58254 126471 4331 40663 61457 317209 3021681 7055854 
xrt 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
   
 
1 
 
Table A7: Elasticities used in the model 
Country/Region Elasticity KW KG KO 
AU   demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.30 0.30 0.30 
BE, GM  demand  -1.67 -3.34 -3.34 
 income  0.22 0.22 0.22 
  supply  0.10 0.10 0.10 
CI, RW demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.49 0.49 0.49 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
CL demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.49 0.49 0.49 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
EN,EN,GR demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.30 0.30 0.30 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
FR demand  -1.83 -3.66 -3.66 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
IT demand  -2.40 -4.80 -4.80 
 income  0.38 0.38 0.38 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
JP demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.37 0.37 0.37 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
NZ demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.18 0.18 0.18 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
SP demand  -1.88 -3.76 -3.76 
 income  0.94 0.94 0.94 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
UK demand  -1.91 -3.83 -3.83 
 income  0.87 0.87 0.87 
  supply  0.10 0.10 0.10 
US demand  -1.70 -3.40 -3.40 
 income  0.29 0.29 0.29 
  supply  0.40 0.40 0.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
